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The objective of this paper is to present a survey of trade issues in agriculture from the 
perspective of developing countries.  Developing countries are a large percentage of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, and agriculture is critical for their 
economic growth, poverty alleviation, food security, and environmental sustainability.  
 
First, this paper identifies trends in production, consumption, and trade of food and 
agriculture over the last decades. Some of the significant developments include the 
emergence of oilseeds and fruits and vegetables as the main exports from developing 
countries, replacing traditional exports such as sugar, coffee and cocoa. The trends also 
show a worsening of developing countries’ net trade position due in part to income 
growth and population pressures, but also to economic policies in general, and trade 
policies in particular, both in developing and industrialized countries.  
  
Second, this paper focuses on some of the main development issues linked to the WTO 
agricultural negotiations.  The objective is to align the different legal components and 
subcomponents of the negotiations under the Agreement on Agriculture, with developing 
countries’ final objectives of sustainable economic growth, poverty alleviation, and food 
security.  
 
This paper concludes that the problems for developing countries are not legal constraints 
under the AoA, but the lack of financial and human resources and institutional 
capabilities.  To link negotiations to their development goals, developing countries must 
consider the issue of funding. Finally, developing countries, most of which have 
embarked in unilateral liberalization over the last decade, should ask that the higher 
levels of protection in industrialized countries be reduced first.  
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1. Introduction   
  
Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) negotiated during the Uruguay Round 
mandated the continuation of the negotiations in agriculture.  They began in March 2000 
and stocktaking of the advances and proposals took place in March 2001 in preparation 
for the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar 9-13 November 2001.   
 
This paper analyzes agricultural trade issues from the perspective of developing 
countries.  Developing countries are a large percentage of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) membership and negotiations will have to take their concerns into account.  In 
addition, agriculture is very important for developing countries in terms of economic 
growth, poverty alleviation, food security, and environmental sustainability. 
 
Discussions about the substance of the topics to be negotiated tend to follow the structure 
of the negotiations, which are organized around policy issues such as tariffs, export 
subsidies, market access, and so on.  This paper utilizes a different organization, trying to 
focus on some of the main development issues linked to the WTO agricultural 
negotiations.  These issues are emerging from the process of consultations and 
negotiations within the WTO, from academic and policy-oriented research on choice of 
development strategy, and debates within civil society.  This paper is a non-technical 
survey.  The ideas, concepts, and assertions presented (particularly those in Section III on 
policy issues) are provisional and will be refined (or discarded, when appropriate) with 
the implementation of the research program.  The objective is to align the different 
components and subcomponents of the negotiations with the final objectives of 
sustainable economic growth, poverty alleviation, and food security.  In order for 
economic growth to fulfill its promise it must be adequately high, but also equitable, 
stable (linked to poverty issues and food security), and sustainable (linked to protection 
of the environment).  
 
Before the policy discussion in section III, a quantitative background is presented in the 
next section.  
 
 
2. Quantitative  Background 
2.1.Agriculture and food production trends 
 
Agricultural production per capita has been steadily increasing in developing countries 
(DC-China), in trend with the world average (Figure 1a).  Since the early 1980s, it has 
grown at an average rate of 0.5 percent, a higher rate than that of industrialized countries 
(0.2 percent), where agricultural production has stagnated before a slight rise in the 
second half of the 1990s.  In transition economies (TE), agriculture net production per  
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capita, increased for most of the period from 1961 to 1990, but dropped in the 1990s to a 
low of $226 (at 1989-91 prices), a level below that of 1960.  But developing countries’ 
agricultural production, which averaged $150 from 1994 to 1998, is still well below the 
world average (World) of $207 and that of developed countries (IND) of $422 for the 
same period (Figure 1a).   
 
The pattern of agricultural production in developing countries is not uniform across 
regions or economic groups:  Asia-developing increased agricultural production in the 
1980s and the larger part of the 1990s, but this promising performance was interrupted in 
1997 following the severe Asian financial crisis.  Production per capita in Africa, was 
stagnant during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, but above the Asian average.  
Production per capita decreased from 1975 until 1985, when it recovered slightly but 
remained below the Asian average (Figure 1b).  The production trend for the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries (LAC) has been increasing on average, particularly in 
the second half of the 1970s and again in the early 1990s (Figure 1b).  In spite of the 
double hit from the financial crises of 1994 and 1997, LAC countries have maintained a 
level of production per capita above both the world and developing averages. 
 
Among the vulnerable economic groups, Least Developed (LDC) countries’ agricultural 
production has been decreasing to levels below the other groups, i.e. the Net Food 
Importing Developing countries (NFIDC), the Low Income Food Deficit (LIFDC) 
countries, and Sub-Sahara African countries (SSA) (Figure 1c).  While still below the 
developing countries average, LIFDC production has increased significantly since the 
early 1980s, but started falling in the late 1990s.  NFIDC agricultural production, has 
been much more variable than that of the other groups, although the trend has been 
increasing.  The group averaged $140 in the 1990s, just below the developing country 
average.  SSA country production, although reversing the downward trend of the 1970s 
and part of the 1980s, is still in the 1990s with an average of $107, below the levels of the 
1960s (Figure 1c).  In SSA, the poor production performance can be associated with the 
high incidence of AIDS, considered to have become a greater threat in rural areas than in 
the cities.  War is another threat to SSA agricultural performance.  In the State of Food 
and Agriculture 2000, FAO estimated that in the period 1990-97, SSA countries suffered 
40 percent loss of agricultural output resulting from conflict  (FAO, 2000: Table 7).   
 
Food production, which comprises for all the regions over 90 percent of agricultural 
production, shows the same pattern as agricultural production (Figures 1d,e, and f).  Asia 
has been particularly successful in increasing production of cereals, vegetable oils, and 
livestock products.  LAC countries increased production in vegetable oils.  SSA countries 
have been slightly more successful in increasing their production of cereals and livestock 
than their production of vegetable oils, and fruit and vegetables (FAO, 1999). 
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Figure 1.  Agriculture and Food Production, 1961-1998 in $US per capita 
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Source:  Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000) database.  
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Consumption, measured in calories per capita per day, has increased in developing 
countries.  The increase is mostly felt in food importing groups, NFIDC and LIFDC, 
where consumption reached above 2,500 calories as of 1995 (Figure 2a).  But for LDCs, 
consumption has stayed around 2,000 calories for the past 40 years.  Consumption has 
increased in all regions, but mostly in Asia, where it is reaching the levels of LAC.  
Although Africa’s consumption has increased slightly, it is lagging behind the other 
regions, below 2,500 calories (Figure 2b).  
 
2.3.Trade of food and agriculture 
 
Trends in net total trade. Figure 3 shows the trends in net exports for agricultural and 
food products (excluding fish) for five regions in both developed and developing 
countries.  The period analyzed is 1961-1999, and the numbers are in current value terms.   
 
There are distinctive differences in trade across North America and Latin America and 
the Caribbean (NALAC), Asia, Africa, the EU, and the transitional economies.  In 
NALAC, the overall trend has been increasing since the early 1970s.  While the net 
exports for food and agricultural products of the United States have experienced a decline 
in the early 1980s and a dramatic fluctuation in the mid 1990s, they have increased at a 
relatively more stable rate in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries.  The 
net exports for agricultural products in the LAC countries as a group reached their peak 
value above $25 billion in 1997 (Figure 3a).  
 
The trends in Asia for both developed (Japan) and developing countries are almost the 
exact opposite of North America and LAC.  Both groups are net importers of food and 
agriculture, and since the 1970s their net imports have increased, but more dramatically 
for Japan.  In 1997, Japan experienced a deficit of more than $40 billion in agricultural 
products—Japan’s dependency on food and agricultural imports is increasing (Figure 3b).  
 
Likewise, in the less developed countries of Africa, the net export of both agricultural and 
food products overall has declined since the mid-1970s.  Especially in the early 1980s, 
Africa has experienced a dramatic decline in net export values for both agricultural and 
food products.  On the other hand, developed Africa (South Africa) has sustained stable 
and positive net export values for both agricultural and food products (Figure 3c).  
 
The trend in the EU is opposite than that in Asia or Africa.  Until the 1980s, the EU 
experienced increasing net imports of food and agriculture.  However, the trend was 
reversed in the early 1980s, and in 1993 the EU became a net exporter of food products.  
Although the EU has experienced small declines since then, the trend in the 1980s and 
1990s continues upward (Figure 3d).   
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Figure 3.  Net Exports in five regions, 1961-1999 
 
(a)                                                                             (b) 
 
(c)                                (d)   
 
                                      (e)                                                         
 Source:  Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000) database. 

























































































































































































































































































































































  7 
 
 
Finally, and similar to Africa, the trend of net exports in transitional economies was 
around zero until the mid-1970s, but declined dramatically until the early 1980s due to 
higher imports.  Although the transitional economies are still net importers, unlike Africa, 
their net import values have been decreasing since the early 1980s due to an increase in 
exports.  Like the EU the trend continues to increase (Figure 3e). 
 
Trade performance of the top 20 traders in agriculture and food. Table 1 gives the results 
of the top 20 rankings of countries for exports, imports, and net exports of food products 
in value.  The top 20 food product exporters cover more than 80 percent of world export 
value.  The US is by far the largest food exporter (14 percent of world food exports), 
followed by France, Netherlands, Germany, Belgium-Luxemburg, Spain, Canada, and 
China.  Combined, these countries export more than half of world food exports.  From the 
table, it is clear that more than half of the top 20 exporters are developed countries, and 
nine of them are members of the EU.  In terms of developing countries, three countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) are LAC countries, and four are from Asia.  None are 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Many of the large exporters are also large importers.  As indicated previously, Asian 
countries' net exports have been negative, and have continued to decline.  This trend is 
also reflected in the ranking of Table 1: there are six major food importers from Asia.  
Among them, Japan, which imports more than 8 percent of world food imports, is the 
second largest importer of food after Germany.  
 
Despite the fact that the US ranks third as a food importer, it is the largest net food 
exporter due to its large share in world food exports.  Unlike the main food exporter 
countries, six of the net-exporting countries of food are developing countries: One from 
Africa (Cote d’Ivoire), three from Asia (Thailand, Malaysia, and Turkey), and four from 
LAC countries (Argentina ranks fifth among net food exporting countries).     
  
Table 2 shows the top twenty exporters, importers, and net exporters of agricultural 
goods.  Among the exporters, the ranking is similar to the ranking of food exporters.  
Developed countries dominate the large share of the world exports.  The United States is 
still the biggest exporter and, similar to its role in food exports, provides about 14 percent 
of the total agricultural exports in the world.  
 
Turkey and Ecuador are no longer among the top twenty net exporters.  Instead, India, 
Columbia, and Costa Rica became major net exporters, ranking 13th, 16th, and 19th 
respectively.  For most of countries listed in Tables 1 and 2, net agricultural exports are 
higher than net food exports, but for Canada, Spain, Hungary, and Belgium-Luxemburg 
the inverse is true.  Finally, Brazil, which ranked 12th among net food exporters, ranks 
sixth among net agricultural exporters.  
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Table1.  Top 20 food products exporters, importers, and net exporters average in value,  1995-1999
Exports Imports Net exports
(billion $US Share (%) (billion $US Share (%) (billion $US)
Exporters Importers Net Exporters
US 41.39 13.82 Germany 28.34 9.10 US 18.41
France 26.94 9.00 Japan 25.91 8.32 France 8.99
Netherlands 21.90 7.32 US 22.98 7.38 Australia 8.57
Germany 17.16 5.73 United Kingdom 18.37 5.90 Netherlands 7.80
Belgium-Luxembourg 14.77 4.93 France 17.95 5.76 Argentina 7.32
Spain 11.85 3.96 China 15.56 4.99 Denmark 5.09
Canada 11.57 3.86 Italy 15.52 4.98 Canada 4.45
China 11.44 3.82 Netherlands 14.10 4.53 Thailand 4.20
Italy 11.29 3.77 Belgium-Luxembourg 12.21 3.92 New Zealand 4.07
Australia 10.33 3.45 Russian Federation 8.01 2.57 Spain 3.85
Argentina 8.32 2.78 Spain 7.99 2.57 Ireland 3.67
United Kingdom 8.14 2.72 Canada 7.12 2.29 Brazil 3.44
Brazil 7.90 2.64 Mexico 5.92 1.90 Malaysia 2.90
Denmark 7.64 2.55 Korea, Republic of 4.95 1.59 Belgium-Luxembourg 2.56
Malaysia 5.81 1.94 Brazil 4.46 1.43 Turkey 1.86
Ireland 5.73 1.91 Saudi Arabia 3.95 1.27 Hungary 1.72
Thailand 5.36 1.79 Indonesia 3.17 1.02 Côte d'Ivoire 1.60
New Zealand 4.85 1.62 Austria 3.03 0.97 Ukraine 1.18
Mexico 4.27 1.42 Switzerland 3.02 0.97 Chile 1.08
Turkey 3.66 1.22 Singapore 2.98 0.96 Ecuador 1.00
Total 80.26 Total 72.40
Source: Authors' calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000).
Table 2.  Top 20 agricultural products exporters, importers, and net exporters, 1995-1999 average
Net exports
(billion $US Share (%) (billion $US Share (%) (billion $US)
Exporters Importers Net Exporters
US 60.22 13.55 Germany 41.43 9.00 US 20.64
France 38.94 8.76 US 39.58 8.59 Netherlands 14.45
Netherlands 34.16 7.69 Japan 38.24 8.30 Australia 12.15
Germany 24.96 5.61 United Kingdom 27.05 5.87 France 12.12
Belgium-Luxembourg 18.60 4.18 France 26.82 5.82 Argentina 9.65
China 18.47 4.16 China 26.05 5.66 Brazil 8.73
United Kingdom 15.95 3.59 Italy 23.81 5.17 Thailand 5.54
Italy 15.84 3.56 Netherlands 19.71 4.28 Denmark 5.35
Australia 14.94 3.36 Belgium-Luxembourg 17.06 3.70 New Zealand 5.07
Canada 14.55 3.27 Spain 12.50 2.71 Canada 4.39
Brazil 14.54 3.27 Russian Federation 10.93 2.37 Ireland 3.85
Spain 14.43 3.25 Canada 10.16 2.21 Malaysia 3.67
Argentina 11.10 2.50 Korea, Republic of 8.84 1.92 India 2.15
Denmark 9.88 2.22 Mexico 7.58 1.65 Côte d'Ivoire 2.12
Thailand 8.30 1.87 Brazil 5.81 1.26 Spain 1.93
Malaysia 7.65 1.72 Switzerland 5.21 1.13 Colombia 1.89
Ireland 6.95 1.56 Singapore 4.83 1.05 Hungary 1.62
Mexico 6.30 1.42 Indonesia 4.67 1.01 Belgium-Luxembourg 1.54
New Zealand 6.17 1.39 Saudi Arabia 4.58 0.99 Costa Rica 1.46
Indonesia 5.54 1.25 Denmark 4.53 0.98 Chile 1.40
Total 78.17 Total 73.69
Source: Authors' calculations are based on FAOSTAT (2000)
Exports Imports 
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 Structure of trade by products. Three types of products dominate agricultural exports 
from developing countries: fruits and vegetables, oilseeds and products, and coffee-tea-
cocoa.  Their combined shares represent more than half total agricultural exports from 
developing countries (1996-99 average).  Cereals, sugar and honey, and meat, although 
not as prevailing, account together for 20 percent of agriculture export earnings.  But 
within this structure, the performance of distinct agricultural products and that of 
developing country subgroups have changed overtime.   
  
In the period from 1961-65 to 1996-99, the composition of agrifood exports from 
developing countries has changed, notably with the emergence of fruits and vegetables, 
and oilseeds and products, as the more dynamic export products.  These two categories 
jumped from about 20 percent of total agricultural exports in the 1960s, to slightly more 
than 35 percent during the 1990s.  They displaced traditional export crops of sugar and 
coffee-tea-cacao.  These traditional crops declined from about 35 to 40 percent of 
agricultural exports during the 1960s-1980s to about 25 percent during the 1990s (Table 
3).  Although cereals exports constitute just below 10 percent of total exports, developing 
countries, as a group, are net importers of cereals. 
 
Important differences across the regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC) can be observed:   
 
African agricultural exports are still dominated by coffee-tea-cocoa, although the share in 
total agricultural exports has declined from above 40 percent in the 1980s to 33 percent in 
the 1990s.  Exports of sugar and honey have been steadily increasing until the late 1980s 
and early 1990s but dropped in the late 1990s.  Africa made a fundamental shift from net 
exporter of oilseeds and meat products until the mid-1970s, to net importer afterwards.  
Oilseeds exports dropped from nearly 15 percent of total agricultural exports in the 1960s 
to just above 6 percent in the 1990s.  Still, these products cover more than 60 percent of 
total Africa’s agricultural exports (Table 4). 
  
Similarly, developing Asia (less China) shows increasing export shares of fruits and 
vegetables as well as oilseeds and products, although the region is still a net importer of 
the latter.  In spite of decreasing export shares from 16 percent in 1961-65 to 11 percent 
in 1996-99, the region is a next exporter of coffee-tea-cocoa (Table 5). 
 
While all three regions are net exporters of fruits and vegetables, and coffee-tea-cocoa, 
LAC has a stronger net export position than the other regions in those products.  A case 
in point is fruits and vegetables, where LAC currently exports about 3.5 times the value 
of its imports, Africa a little more than twice, and Asia nearly 1.5 times.  Despite coffee-
tea-cocoa, and sugar and honey losing their dominant shares in agricultural exports, from 
30 and 19 percent in 1961-65 to 17 and 9 percent in 1996-99, respectively, the LAC 
region is a net exporter of both (Table 6). 
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Table 3—Structure of agricultural exports—DC 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    9.12 9.21 8.72 7.57 9.31 6.58 8.22 9.42 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 22.94 23.84 20.16 28.29 22.29 20.42 13.91 15.22 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    9.43 12.21 11.52 12.18 14.59 18.15 20.35 19.26 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    3.53 4.78 4.96 3.98 4.42 4.72 6.00 5.46 
Natural  Rubber    7.14 5.81 4.95 5.43 4.38 4.54 4.18 3.64 
Oilseed  &  Products  10.40  9.55 11.21 12.26 14.11 13.97 15.61 16.65 
Sugar and Honey   10.79  9.58  16.85  12.73  12.26  9.65  6.71  6.24 
Textile  Fibres    14.74  13.23  10.63 7.27 6.56 6.72 4.29 3.29 
Tobacco  3.13 2.73 3.01 2.78 3.37 3.88 6.58 6.36 
Other  8.78  9.04  7.98  7.52  8.70 11.36 14.15 14.47 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 4—Structure of agricultural exports--Africa 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    5.01 5.18 5.58 4.27 4.26 3.99 4.38 4.20 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 23.23 28.77 29.77 43.67 40.53 38.95 28.24 32.93 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    11.50 11.99 11.56 10.68 11.87 13.07 17.44 16.28 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    1.74 2.30 2.65 1.92 1.50 1.43 2.11 1.72 
Natural  Rubber    1.85 1.51 1.26 1.13 1.36 1.73 1.73 1.83 
Oilseed  &  Products  14.95  12.68  10.73 7.40 5.72 4.95 6.20 6.08 
Sugar  and  Honey    4.57 4.48 7.70 7.01 6.81 8.22 7.83 7.15 
Textile  Fibres    19.46 17.49 16.13 11.35 12.95 12.58 10.82 10.04 
Tobacco  3.72 2.13 2.67 2.59 4.02 4.44 7.29 7.16 
Other  13.97 13.46 11.97  9.99 10.97 10.64 13.98 12.62 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 5—Structure of agricultural exports—Developing Asia less china 
 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    13.04 11.08 10.30 11.42 13.30 10.82 11.60 13.35 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 15.61 14.74 10.40 13.92 12.98 13.69 10.14 11.17 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    9.10 12.36 14.03 16.10 18.16 20.62 20.21 17.42 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    0.31 0.42 0.94 1.21 1.89 2.16 2.46 2.74 
Natural  Rubber    20.25 18.36 16.10 17.21 12.85 12.87 10.65  9.10 
Oilseed  &  Products  11.85 11.77 14.78 15.83 16.24 14.33 17.27 18.63 
Sugar  and  Honey    5.12 4.02 9.68 5.61 5.17 3.69 4.68 4.37 
Textile  Fibres    14.36  15.01  11.66 7.14 5.54 5.11 2.81 2.40 
Tobacco  4.45 4.99 4.79 4.11 4.19 3.97 6.07 7.07 
Other  5.92  7.25  7.32  7.44  9.69 12.73 14.11 13.76 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00  
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Net Food Importing Developing countries (NFIDC) and Least-developed countries 
(LDC) have increased their export shares of coffee-tea-cocoa, and fruits and vegetables 
from a combined share of 31 percent  (1961-65) to 55 percent (1996-99) for NFIDC, and 
from 29 percent to 39 percent for LDC in the same periods.  Sugar and honey exports 
have dominated NFIDC agricultural exports until the 1990s, with a share ranging from 30 
to 45 percent of total agricultural exports.  In 1996-99, the share dropped below 14 
percent and this sector is now third in rank after coffee-tea-cocoa, and fruits and 
vegetables (Tables 7 and 8).  
  
 
Table 6—Structure of agricultural exports—Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    8.62 9.33 8.52 6.87 9.16 4.54 6.36 8.16 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 29.69 28.78 22.20 31.60 24.30 23.48 17.01 16.55 
Fruit + Vegetables   8.18  10.61  8.93  9.35  12.56  18.33  23.28  22.10 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    7.49 9.40 8.41 6.04 6.22 5.90 7.40 6.23 
Natural  Rubber    0.16 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.08 
Oilseed  &  Products  4.48  4.55  9.23 12.83 15.77 17.71 20.19 20.81 
Sugar and Honey   19.14  17.89  28.92  21.32  21.31  18.13  9.60  8.96 
Textile  Fibres    14.63  11.34 7.06 5.35 3.89 3.27 2.42 1.48 
Tobacco  1.60 1.55 2.00 1.92 2.54 2.63 4.08 4.35 
Other  6.01 6.42 4.67 4.68 4.24 5.97 9.60  11.28 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 7—Structure of agricultural exports--NFIDC 
 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    3.98 5.61 4.19 3.73 3.80 3.16 6.34 7.67 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 20.53 20.68 17.17 27.16 23.43 24.79 27.75 37.13 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    10.13 12.80 10.39  9.80 10.82 13.52 18.58 17.37 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    0.67 1.01 1.27 1.08 1.03 0.95 1.65 0.92 
Natural  Rubber    2.09 2.21 1.48 1.37 1.21 1.16 1.32 1.22 
Oilseed  &  Products  7.25 6.21 5.53 3.82 2.56 2.71 5.43 4.55 
Sugar  and  Honey    30.63 28.47 41.09 41.23 44.25 39.03 20.65 13.80 
Textile  Fibres    18.25  16.32  13.12 6.97 7.98 9.01 7.17 4.88 
Tobacco  2.04 2.48 2.01 1.53 1.65 1.53 2.98 3.91 
Other  4.44 4.21 3.76 3.33 3.28 4.14 8.13 8.55 
Total Agricultural 
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Table 8—Structure of agricultural exports—LDC 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    14.96 9.15 4.64 4.36 5.57 2.71 4.14 2.03 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 22.80 29.78 32.51 43.31 38.75 37.14 27.39 27.44 
Fruit + Vegetables   6.08  6.77  8.60  6.89  9.05  9.53  10.50  11.30 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    1.04 1.24 1.67 0.64 0.42 0.42 0.53 0.84 
Natural  Rubber    3.50 2.91 2.36 2.39 2.41 2.96 1.48 2.00 
Oilseed  &  Products  12.77  11.80  12.93 8.26 6.44 5.50 6.72 7.88 
Sugar  and  Honey    1.79 1.62 2.08 1.58 1.76 2.09 2.44 2.45 
Textile  Fibres    26.49 24.31 21.51 17.25 15.34 18.08 20.71 20.71 
Tobacco  1.67 2.07 2.80 3.17 3.77 5.20 8.13 9.24 
Other  8.90 10.36 10.89 12.15 16.50 16.36 17.97 16.10 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
In terms of the composition of developing country imports, the combined import shares 
of cereals, oilseeds, dairy, and meat products together have varied between 50 to 57 
percent of total agricultural imports during the period considered.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, developing country imports of cereals and dairy products made up more than 40 
percent of their total imports, but while the import share of cereals slowly decreased to 
below 24 percent, dairy products maintained their share between 6 and 7 percent (Table 
9).  Imports of oilseed and products, historically a main export, reached 16 percent of 
total agricultural imports in the second half of the 1990s, but represented in the same 
period also nearly 17 percent of total agricultural exports (Tables 3 and 9). 
 
Although all the regions are net importers of cereals and dairy products, the imbalance is 
larger in Africa, where the ratio of exports to imports for these products combined 
represents only 9 percent on average for the period 1995-1999.  In LAC, net imports of 
cereals and dairy are more than compensated by net trade surpluses in other agricultural 
products.  Asia and Africa, however, are net agricultural importers, where net trade 
surpluses in coffee, cocoa, fruits and vegetables, and some other items, do not 
compensate for trade deficits in other products.  Overall, agricultural exports and imports 
have also become more diversified in the regional groups.  
  
The structures of agricultural imports of NFIDC and LDC have changed overtime.  
Clearly, cereals are still the main agricultural imports, covering more than a third of total 
agricultural imports, but their shares have declined since the 1970s, when they were at an 
all time high, by more than 20 percent (Tables 10 and 11).  For NFIDC, this decline in 
cereals imports is coupled with an increase in food production (Figure 1f) but not a 
decrease in food consumption (Figure 2a).  
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Table 9—Structure of agricultural imports—DC 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    38.28 38.19 39.15 32.48 32.43 26.08 23.70 23.96 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 5.49 5.57 3.92 4.78 4.09 4.12 3.62 3.39 
Dairy  Products+Eggs  6.61 6.65 6.27 6.97 7.60 7.47 6.73 6.02 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    7.65 8.47 7.34 8.21 8.26 8.83 9.59 9.38 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    3.01 3.46 3.49 5.10 6.12 5.97 5.93 5.92 
Natural  Rubber    2.33 2.10 1.60 1.62 1.20 1.71 1.41 1.36 
Oilseeds&products  5.97  6.12  7.73 10.12 11.03 11.39 12.48 16.05 
Sugar  and  Honey    7.15 4.85 8.74 7.32 6.38 5.73 5.39 5.23 
Textile  Fibres    8.30 7.62 7.11 6.91 5.70 7.44 7.24 6.20 
Tobacco  3.09 3.16 2.54 3.16 3.31 4.39 5.76 5.26 
Other  12.13 13.81 12.10 13.33 13.87 16.87 18.16 17.23 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Table 10—Structure of agricultural imports--NFIDC 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    37.63 37.69 42.79 38.65 37.67 34.63 32.56 33.04 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 7.32 8.01 4.29 4.83 4.34 5.36 5.01 4.32 
Dairy  Products+Eggs  8.15 7.59 6.99 7.61 7.97 8.44 8.18 6.83 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    8.22 8.11 5.69 5.70 5.49 5.09 6.83 7.09 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    4.08 3.85 3.06 4.61 5.69 5.67 3.53 3.17 
Natural  Rubber    0.80 0.76 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.69 0.72 0.61 
Oilseeds&products  7.39  8.69 11.85 13.11 14.09 15.47 17.68 19.62 
Sugar  and  Honey    7.83 5.19 7.74 6.57 6.60 6.33 6.86 7.18 
Textile  Fibres    2.96 3.28 3.12 2.92 2.72 3.60 3.74 3.22 
Tobacco  2.99 2.30 1.89 2.67 2.60 2.42 2.99 3.08 
Other  12.63 14.53 11.97 12.70 12.32 12.29 11.91 11.84 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
Table 11—Structure of agricultural imports—LDC 
 
  1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-99 
Cereals  and  Prep    30.63 34.79 46.24 38.34 41.23 37.24 37.87 36.66 
Coffee+Tea+Cocoa+Sp. 5.72 5.85 4.47 4.60 3.43 3.53 2.89 3.12 
Dairy  Products+Eggs  7.36 7.21 6.23 8.64 9.64 9.68 7.03 5.70 
Fruit  +  Vegetables    5.83 5.68 4.12 5.75 5.43 5.75 6.65 6.86 
Meat  and  Meat  Prep    2.91 3.10 2.24 3.98 4.74 4.56 3.77 3.14 
Natural  Rubber    0.14 0.21 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.18 
Oilseeds&products  9.52  8.56  5.73  8.08  8.67 10.99 13.14 16.36 
Sugar and Honey   10.68  7.72  11.87  10.67  7.99  7.98  7.98  8.87 
Textile  Fibres    4.91 4.57 3.04 2.65 2.52 2.39 2.75 4.37 
Tobacco  5.62 6.11 3.91 4.96 4.23 4.55 5.20 4.19 
Other  16.69 16.19 11.92 12.06 11.90 13.08 12.52 10.56 
Total Agricultural 
Products  100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000) database.  




Direction of trade. Tables 12 and 13 show the direction of trade in both exports to and 
imports from four different regions of developed countries.  From these two tables, we 
can see the generalized inter-regional patterns and directions of trade.  
  
In Table 12, it is clear that transitional economies, the Middle East, and Africa, heavily 
export to the EU.  Their exports to non-EU countries are less than 10 percent on average.  
In some countries, more than 60 percent of agricultural exports goes to the EU.  On the 
other hand, the share of agricultural exports to major developed countries in Asia is 
relatively balanced except for a few exceptions—the agricultural export of Malaysia and 
Sri Lanka are heavily skewed toward trading with Australia and New Zealand.  Among 
the balanced distribution of trading partners, developing Asian countries have a relatively 
higher tendency to export to Japan and Korea.  Also, like other developing countries 
around the world, more than 60 percent of total agricultural exports in developing Asian 
countries are to the developed countries. 
 
The export partners of Latin American developing countries are mostly the EU and 
US/Canada.  Less than 10 percent of their agricultural exports go to Japan/Korea and 
Australia/New Zealand (except for Chile).  Among these countries of Latin America, 
Mexico’s agricultural exports to US/Canada are exceptionally high (70 percent).  Latin 
American countries, like other developing countries, tend to export their agricultural 
goods to developed countries.  However, there are some exceptions.  When we look at the 
share in Argentina and Uruguay, only 37percent and 35percent respectively of their 
exports go to developed countries.  
 
In terms of the share of imports (Table 13) from major developed countries, trends are 
very similar to the export trends.  However, there are a few distinctive differences.  First, 
Asian imports from Japan/Korea are very low relative to other major regions of 
developed countries including Australia/New Zealand.  Second, the overall dependency 
of imports on major developed countries is still large, but it is relatively smaller than that 
of exports.  Third, Africa has more trade interactions with US/Canada than that of the 
export case.    
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Table 12.  Direction of Trade: Shares of Agricultural Exports to Major Developed 
Countries, in percent. 
  
countries/regions  EU  US/Can  Japan/Kor  Aus/Nzl  Total 
China  12.70  4.00  36.40  18.20  71.30 
Indonesia  23.50  19.20  22.50  6.00  71.20 
Malaysia  9.70  4.70  8.70  53.80  76.90 
Philippines  16.00  34.20  24.90  9.80  84.90 
Thailand  15.20  24.20  28.90  11.90  80.20 
Viet Nam  18.60  13.00  24.90  17.70  74.20 
Bangladesh  27.50  29.30  11.20  2.90  70.90 
India  18.10  12.20  13.20  5.80  49.30 
Sri Lanka  29.10  6.30  15.80  42.40  93.60 
Rest of South Asia  22.90  6.80  6.50  5.10  41.30 
Mexico  12.40  69.90  5.90  1.30  89.50 
Central America and Caribbean  35.00  37.80  5.90  0.80  79.50 
Colombia  41.80  36.80  7.80  0.70  87.10 
Peru  26.50  18.90  9.20  5.10  59.70 
Venezuela  26.20  26.20  4.30  2.10  58.80 
Rest of Andean Pact  25.20  35.80  4.90  2.30  68.20 
Argentina  23.20  6.60  4.80  2.30  36.90 
Brazil  39.20  12.10  8.20  2.90  62.40 
Chile  25.10  30.50  22.60  3.30  81.50 
Uruguay  24.40  7.60  1.90  1.20  35.10 
Rest of South America  47.60  9.30  18.50  0.20  75.60 
Hungary  42.10  3.70  1.60  0.70  48.10 
Poland  40.10  3.60  7.00  0.50  51.20 
Rest of Central European associates  33.30  5.70  2.50  1.00  42.50 
Former Soviet Union  25.90  7.80  12.50  0.90  47.10 
Turkey  46.60  10.90  1.70  1.40  60.60 
Rest of Middle East  42.20  11.10  5.60  3.40  62.30 
Morocco  60.80  4.80  19.20  0.30  85.10 
Rest of North Africa  55.00  9.30  5.80  1.80  71.90 
Botswana  50.70  10.20  10.30  4.50  75.70 
Rest of SACU  49.30  9.80  9.70  4.40  73.20 
Malawi  48.20  19.60  7.60  0.90  76.30 
Mozambique  52.20  17.00  12.00  3.00  84.20 
Tanzania, United Republic of  37.80  4.10  10.10  6.60  58.60 
Zambia  66.90  3.70  2.80  3.30  76.70 
Zimbabwe  45.70  3.10  4.60  4.20  57.60 
Rest of southern Africa  84.40  7.00  4.60  1.20  97.20 
Uganda  69.00  9.50  1.10  2.30  81.90 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  61.60  7.80  6.20  1.50  77.10 
Rest of world  41.30  9.30  8.90  6.80  66.30 
Source: Authors' calculations based on GTAP (1998)  




Table 13.  Direction of Trade: Shares of Agricultural Imports to Major Developed 
Countries, in percent. 
 
  
countries/regions  EU  US/Can  Japan/Kor  Aus/Nzl  Total 
China  15.60  23.30  8.40  10.50  57.80 
Indonesia  10.10  22.60  3.80  23.80  60.30 
Malaysia  12.50  16.20  2.70  22.30  53.70 
Philippines  17.70  29.00  3.20  19.70  69.60 
Thailand  21.90  18.40  7.90  16.10  64.30 
Viet Nam  19.00  11.30  6.80  22.50  59.60 
Bangladesh  8.00  14.40  0.70  15.60  38.70 
India  9.90  10.80  2.60  21.30  44.60 
Sri Lanka  14.00  9.50  1.40  20.90  45.80 
Rest of South Asia  6.20  20.60  0.80  17.10  44.70 
Mexico  11.80  73.80  2.10  2.90  90.60 
Rest of central America and Caribbean  19.90  46.60  2.00  2.90  71.40 
Colombia  8.00  44.40  1.20  2.30  55.90 
Peru  10.40  25.70  1.30  4.90  42.30 
Venezuela  17.40  41.20  1.30  3.50  63.40 
Rest of Andean Pact  10.30  32.60  1.10  2.70  46.70 
Argentina  20.40  23.70  2.30  2.90  49.30 
Brazil  16.20  14.10  1.30  2.70  34.30 
Chile  13.50  17.00  2.10  3.00  35.60 
Uruguay  24.30  7.10  3.10  1.80  36.30 
Rest of South America  17.00  15.00  0.50  0.60  33.10 
Hungary  51.70  7.60  4.20  1.40  64.90 
Poland  53.00  7.30  1.40  0.90  62.60 
Rest of Central European associates  49.40  4.70  2.50  1.70  58.30 
Former Soviet Union  40.20  10.30  1.70  1.80  54.00 
Turkey  31.10  25.40  3.20  6.90  66.60 
Rest of Middle East  33.80  20.10  1.40  5.90  61.20 
Morocco  31.00  24.00  2.10  3.30  60.40 
Rest of North Africa  34.70  28.50  1.70  5.40  70.30 
Botswana  40.50  12.70  1.30  6.90  61.40 
Rest of SACU  28.30  14.90  4.10  7.50  54.80 
Malawi  32.70  10.10  4.90  5.60  53.30 
Mozambique  15.90  31.60  1.90  9.40  58.80 
Tanzania, United Republic of  17.10  8.30  2.60  12.20  40.20 
Zambia  25.80  9.70  4.70  5.20  45.40 
Zimbabwe  9.90  3.00  1.40  15.20  29.50 
Rest of southern Africa  50.80  6.10  2.40  9.60  68.90 
Uganda  44.60  31.50  3.30  2.30  81.70 
Rest of sub-Saharan Africa  53.90  12.70  1.10  2.20  69.90 
Rest of world  41.40  11.10  3.40  9.90  65.80 
Source: Authors' calculations based on GTAP (1998)  
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Table 14 shows indicators of price volatility for agricultural commodities.  There are a 
few important points to note from this table.  First, almost all the coefficients of price 
variability during the Uruguay Round policy implementations (1995 to 1999) are lower 
than those of the thirty-year time trend from 1960 to 1999.  In other words, prices after 
the completion of the Uruguay Round appear less volatile.  Second, price variability for 
many commodities between 1995 and 1999 is lower than for the whole decade of the 
1990s.  These results show that world commodity prices are relatively more stable after 
the completion of Uruguay Round.  
 Table 14     Coefficient of Variability for Price: constant value 
1960-1999  1990s  1995-1999 
Cocoa (cents/kg)  0.54  0.14  0.13 
Coffee Mild (cents/kg)  0.40  0.29  0.21 
Coffee Robusta (cents/kg)  0.55  0.26  0.14 
Tea (cents/kg)  0.20  0.19  0.21 
Sugar (cents/kg)  0.81  0.16  0.17 
Orange ($/mt)  0.11  0.08  0.01 
Banana ($/mt)  0.11  0.12  0.11 
Beef (cents/kg)  0.21  0.13  0.06 
Wheat ($/mt)  0.22  0.14  0.16 
Rice ($/mt)  0.34  0.13  0.07 
Maize ($/mt)  0.21  0.16  0.17 
Sorghum ($/mt)  0.21  0.13  0.15 
Coconut Oil ($/mt)  0.36  0.29  0.15 
Soybean Oil ($/mt)  0.30  0.18  0.13 
Groundnut Oil ($/mt)  0.28  0.15  0.08 
Palm Oil ($/mt)  0.30  0.29  0.19 
Soybean ($/mt)  0.22  0.11  0.12 
Soybean Meal ($/mt)  0.27  0.16  0.21 
Cotton (cents/kg)  0.19  0.14  0.12 
Source:Authors' calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000)  




2.5.Production and consumption volatility 
 
Tables 15 to 17 show the volatility of food production and calories and protein 
consumption in three different time periods.  
 
In food production (Table 15), the more recent trend is less volatile than for the last forty 
years.  Overall, volatility in developing countries (Asia, Africa, and LAC) is relatively 
larger than in developed countries (EU, US, and Japan).  However, developing countries 
have experienced a dramatic decrease in their volatility of food production in more recent 
years.  During the Uruguay Round policy implementation period (1995 to 2000), the 
volatility of food production for developing countries was between 5 to 6 percent, less 
than half compared to the whole period 1961 to 2000. 
 
The volatility indicators for calories (Table 16) and protein consumption (Table 17) have 
declined, as with food production, although the overall percentage levels for volatility are 
smaller for calorie and protein consumption compared to production.  When the past 10 
years are compared with the 5 years during the Uruguay Round policy implementation 
period, as for food production, the volatility of calories and protein consumption has 
decreased more in the latter period.  Also, volatility for developing areas is relatively 
more than that for developed areas.  
2.6.Heterogeneity of developing countries 
 
The quantitative analysis of the agricultural performance of developing countries points 
to the notion that developing countries form a very heterogeneous group.   
 
A study by Valdes and McCalla identifies, among 148 developing countries, 105 
countries that are net food importers and 43 that are net food exporters (15 are from the 
low income group).  In total agriculture, 85 are identified as net importers and 63 as net 
exporters (33 are from the low income group).  Among the most vulnerable economic 
groups, over one third of LDC are net agricultural exporters, more than half of the low 
income food deficit countries (LIFDC) are net agricultural exporters, 19 percent are net 
food exporters, and 22 net food importers are net agricultural exporters (Valdes and 
McCalla, 1999).  These findings are consistent with the results emerging from the 
classification of the top 20 traders in food and agriculture in Tables 1 and 2.  There are 7 
developing countries among the top 20 food exporters and half of the top 20 net food 
exporters are developing countries. 
 
For most developing countries, the major agricultural trading partners are developed 
countries, but many differences emerge within regional groupings.  Africa mostly trades 
with the EU, LAC trades with both the USA and the EU but imports mostly from the 
USA, and Asia mostly exports to Asian developed countries but imports from the EU, 
North America, and Asia (Tables 13 and 14).  







Trends of production per capita of food and agriculture also differ among developing 
countries by regions and economic groups.  The best performers are the LAC countries, 
Asian developing countries are steadily improving, but Africa’s situation is at best 
stagnant.  The NFIDC and the LIFDC are also improving their production of food and 
agriculture, but are still performing below developing country levels.  On the other hand, 
LDC and SSA countries continue to experience declining trends in food and agricultural 
production. 
 
  Table 15     Volatility for food production 
1961-2000  1991-2000  1995-2000 
Asia   0.150  0.100  0.050 
Africa   0.110  0.080  0.060 
LAC   0.110  0.080  0.050 
EU   0.060  0.040  0.030 
Japan  0.050  0.040  0.030 
US  0.050  0.040  0.020 
Source: Authors'  calculations based on FAOSTAT (2000) 
 Table 16     Volatility for calories consumption 
1961-2000  1991-2000  1995-2000 
Asia  0.051  0.030  0.012 
Africa  0.056  0.031  0.014 
LAC  0.041  0.022  0.010 
EU   0.023  0.016  0.007 
Japan  0.012  0.004  0.001 
US  0.014  0.006  0.005 
Source: Authors' calculation based on FAOSTAT (2000) 
 Table 17     Volatility for protein consumption 
1961-2000  1991-2000  1995-2000 
Asia   0.057  0.034  0.019 
Africa  0.063  0.038  0.020 
LAC  0.055  0.037  0.017 
EU   0.024  0.017  0.008 
Japan  0.020  0.007  0.008 
US  0.022  0.006  0.002 
Source: Authors' calculation based on FAOSTAT (2000)  
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3.  Policy Issues  
 
We focus mainly on the agricultural aspects of the negotiations as incorporated in the 
Agreement on Agriculture of the WTO.  But to the extent that other issues that may affect 
agriculture are currently being reviewed, or may be part of a larger Round, we also 
comment on them.  
 
It is important to keep in mind a distinction between what is legal under the WTO and 
what are the economic implications of those legally available measures.  In this regard, an 
obvious point (which is sometimes overlooked) must be stressed: the fact that a country 
has the legal alternative under the WTO rules of following a specific policy does not 
mean that in terms of general welfare and equity (for that country and/or for others) such 
policy is a good idea.  The next sections cover both legal and economic aspects, trying to 
distinguish, if necessary, those aspects related to achieving what may be seen as a fair 
and balanced outcome in legal terms, and the efficiency, welfare, or equity merits of 
those commitments.    
 
3.1.Is Agriculture Special? 
 
One of the central debates relates to how (or whether) to incorporate agriculture within 
the general framework of the WTO, after having been subject to a separate treatment 
under previous GATT rules.  This differentiated treatment was in part reduced during the 
Uruguay Round, but the current WTO legal texts do not yet reflect a full integration of 
agriculture within the rules for goods in general.   
 
There are two different views on what to do about this.  One opinion insists that 
agriculture should not be treated differently from other sectors, like industry, and 
therefore current negotiations should complete the integration of agriculture into the 
WTO framework.  One of the main issues in this regard is related to export subsidies, 
which are banned in the WTO legal framework for all goods, but are still allowed, 
although with some restrictions, in the current Agreement on Agriculture.   
 
Another view emphasizes the special role of agriculture, and wants to keep a special 
treatment for this sector.  Usually this view is linked to the notion of the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture, which has been recently presented, mainly by 
industrialized countries, as a new concept that must be considered in the design and 
implementation of agricultural policies (European Union, 1999; Royal Ministry of 
Agriculture Norway, 1998; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 1999; 
OECD, 1998).  This notion has received special attention in different recent conferences 
devoted to the issue (for example, Workshop in Gran, Norway, 1999; FAO/Netherlands, 
1999), and, besides references in different country proposals, it has been the subject of 
one of the longest documents presented in the WTO negotiations by a collection of 
industrialized and developing countries (WTO, 2000). 
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The basic idea is that agriculture, in addition to its direct products, also generates positive 
externalities such as food security, environmental conservation, beautiful rural 
landscapes, employment, and vital rural communities and cultures.  According to this 
view, only counting the market value of agricultural products overlooks the sector’s 
additional contributions to economy and society, contributions that, because of different 
market failures, may not be generated automatically by market forces.  A policy 
conclusion from this line of analysis is that the government could justifiably intervene to 
ensure an adequate supply of these externalities. 
 
The idea of multifunctionality has become a contentious issue in the continuation of the 
agricultural negotiations mandated by Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The European Union, Norway, Japan, and 
South Korea, among other countries, have argued that this concept is part of the non-trade 
concerns alluded in the Article 20 and the Preamble of the Agreement on Agriculture, 
which must be taken into account during these coming negotiations.  Other countries 
(basically the members of the Cairns Group and the United States) have opposed granting 
an independent role for multifunctionality in the conceptual framework of the 
negotiations (ABARE, 1999; USDA, 1999).  Developing countries are taking differing 
views on multifunctionality: some appear in favor, others are opposing it, and some more 
are still pondering whether the idea has something to offer them in terms of their 
negotiating positions and policy framework.  
 
Those opposed to the notion of multifunctionality argue that showing that a productive 
sector (in this case agriculture, but similarly for others) has positive externalities for the 
rest of the society does not necessarily imply that it has to be especially encouraged 
beyond the level that it would have normally attained under no intervention.  One issue is 
that the sector may have negative externalities as well, such as damages to the 
environment.  Moreover, subsidizing a sector to make it expand beyond what would have 
otherwise been its normal level will increase its use of all types of resources from the 
economy, competing with other sectors.  To the extent that some of those resources are 
not completely idle, costs of production will increase in the non-subsidized sectors, which 
may force them to contract.  Then a cost-benefit analysis would be needed to assess 
whether the costs of encouraging a sector beyond its “natural” level (in terms of the main 
products and of the externalities attached to them) may be larger than the benefits, 
considering the multifunctionality effects of other sectors.  Even if there is undersupply 
of net positive externalities for the society as a whole (considering the agricultural sector 
itself and the impact on other sectors) due to the lack of production of the basic items that 
generate them, the next question is what is the best policy to foster those externalities.  
Most economists would argue that the first-best alternative would most likely not be trade 
protection.  Also, even within a range of possible trade and/or production distorting 
policies, it may be the case that policies other than the ones currently applied generate the 
desired multifunctional effects (Blandford, 2000).  In particular, if it were not clear that 
some of the postulated externalities emerge only as inseparable joint products, then it 
would be better to subsidize directly the multifunctionality effect, rather than the 
underlying production.   
  
  22 
 
 
Most of the discussion so far has centered on whether the benefits of multifunctionality 
are jointly and inseparably obtained with agricultural production (and therefore if a 
country wants those benefits it has to support production, possibly distorting trade in the 
process), or whether the benefits have a separate existence (and thus can be generated 
through non-distorting, green-box measures).  This paper does not expand on these 
arguments.  They have been already covered in detail in different publications, arguing 
both sides of the policy debate (European Union, 1999; Royal Ministry of Agriculture 
Norway, 1998; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan, 1999; OECD, 
1998, ABARE, 1998, USDA 1999; SJFI, 2001) 
 
Rather, we highlight here two different issues related to the concept of multifunctionality 
and the special role of agriculture, which have been less analyzed but whose implications 
for developing countries may be more significant. 
  
The first point is whose multifunctionality is being addressed through the suggested 
policies, to the extent that there are distributional issues involved.  The second point is 
what multifunctionality is being discussed, considering that it seems to encompass 
several components.  
 
Whose multifunctionality? If the premise that multifunctionality is a joint product with 
agricultural production is provisionally accepted for the sake of argument, the immediate 
problem is whose agricultural production levels are being supported and whose ones may 
be hurt in the process.  Simulation models for the Uruguay Round, as well as preliminary 
projections of possible scenarios for the current negotiations, all show increases in 
agricultural production in developing countries, if the distortions in world agricultural 
policies, which are dominated by those of the industrialized countries, are reduced 
(Sharma, Konandreas, and Greenfield, 1996;  Goldin and van-der-Mensbrugghe, 1995, 
for the Uruguay Round; Hertel, et al 2000; OECD, 1999; USDA/ERS, 2001; ABARE, 
1999, for the current negotiations).  
 
Given some level of demand for food and agricultural products determined by income, 
prices, population, and tastes, any attempt at expanding production in a group of 
countries on account of the multifunctionality effects would result in production 
reductions in other groups of countries that may not have the resources to expand 
agricultural production through such subsidies.  To the extent that the notion of 
multifunctionality has been suggested mainly by industrialized countries, which have the 
resources to implement subsidies, the result of such an approach may be more production 
and multifunctional effects in richer countries, and less of both in developing countries, 
which cannot afford such policies.   
 
What multifunctionality? Related to the distributional issue is the question of what 
multifunctionality is being considered.  The fact that different concepts are put together 
under a same name, such as multifunctionality, or non-trade concerns, does not 
necessarily implies that they have strong similarities, that important distinctions may not 
be needed among them, or, even more complicated from a policy perspective, that there 
may be trade-offs among those concerns.    




Although the possibility of trade-offs across those non-trade concerns may be an 
important policy issue, here the point to be stressed is the possibility of differentiation 
within each of those concerns: all of them seem to have completely different meanings 
for industrialized countries, on the one hand, and for the variety of developing countries, 
on the other.  For example, it has been argued that one thing is the issue of rural 
employment and vitality of rural communities in industrialized countries, where subsidies 
are predicated in part on the need to support a choice of life style, while a completely 
different situation occurs in developing countries where most of the population is in 
agriculture, not because that is where they want to be, but because the development 
process has not offered them other alternatives (FAO, 1999, comments by Abhijet Sen, 
p.65;  India 2001). 
 
Also the notion of food security appears to have different meanings for different 
countries.  The WTO recognizes various classifications of countries: developed, 
developing, least developed (LDC) and net food importing developing (NFIDC).  A 
possible question is how well do these categories capture issues of food security?  A 
recent study utilizes various methods of cluster analysis and data on five measures of 
food security (food production per capita, the ratio of total exports to food imports, 
consumption of calories per capita, consumption of proteins per capita, and the rural/non-
rural population share) to classify 167 countries (including industrialized and developing 
ones) according to their food security profiles (Diaz-Bonilla et al., 2000).  The analysis 
identifies 12 distinct clusters characterized by similarities and differences across the 
various measures.  The analysis suggests that the category of Least Developed Countries 
consists of largely food insecure countries, but that there also are food insecure countries 
that are not LDCs.  NFIDCs is less precise as an indicator of food vulnerability, with 
more than a third of those countries not falling under any of the food insecure groups.  
Also, the general category of “developing countries” is very heterogeneous and is not 
very useful if the focus is on issues of food security.  Finally, the typology shows that all 
developed countries are included in food secure categories.  These results suggest that the 
notion of food security introduced as part of the “multifunctionality” of agriculture, or, 
more generally, among non-trade concerns has a very different meaning in developed and 
developing countries.  Maintaining the same label for altogether different situations in 
industrialized and developing countries (with further differentiations among the latter) 
may only obscure the issues being negotiated (Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000).    
 
Environmental problems also differ across countries, appearing mostly as pollution of 
land and water, due to excess use of agrochemicals in industrialized countries (in part, a 
consequence of generous production subsidies) and degradation and overuse of natural 
resources in developing countries (resulting mostly from poverty and lack of financial 
support to improve technology).  Finally the issue of maintenance of rural landscapes in 
industrialized countries, as a way of allowing urban dwellers scenic vistas and the 
possibility of country-side relaxation, does not seem to have an obvious equivalent in 
impoverished developing countries.  
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Some policy issues and implications for the negotiations. In summary, the previous 
discussion stresses the need to differentiate between the sets of issues of interest for 
industrialized countries and those that mostly affect developing countries, specially the 
poorer ones.  Rather than talking about multifunctionality as a single notion, it would be 
better to separate non-trade concerns and then analyze them separately for different 
categories of countries.  The case for an economic strategy in developing countries that 
ensures the full contribution of the agricultural sector can be based on traditional 
arguments linked to growth dynamics, poverty alleviation, food security, and 
environmental issues, as they apply to developing countries.  The several components 
involved in the notion of multifunctionality assume very different forms in industrialized 
and developing countries.  By mixing all of them, the negotiations risk losing sight what 
is important for developing countries, particularly the poorest ones.   
 
Moreover, the notion of multifunctionality may be not only unnecessary for developing 
countries to support the policies needed for rural development, but may also be harmful.  
This would be the case if it leads mostly to expand the production of industrialized 
countries more than what would have been the case without the additional support 
predicated upon such notion.  In this case, agricultural production in developing countries 
(and the multifunctional effects linked to it) would be encroached upon, and contracted, 
because of the excess of subsidized production in industrialized countries.  Through the 
linkages of world markets, agriculture is affected globally, and if the agricultural sector in 
industrial countries expands beyond certain level, given some world demand that grows 
with income and population, any expansion of agriculture in industrialized countries will 
prevent the expansion of production in developing countries affecting the potential 
beneficial externalities from agricultural sector on the economies of developing countries. 
 
Therefore, in what follows, the analysis of the WTO negotiations is presented in terms of 
the traditional issues of agricultural growth, rural development, poverty, and food 
security, as they apply to developing countries.  Before discussing trade’s relationship 
with growth (section 3.3), poverty, and food security (section 3.4), the next session 
discusses he issue of how adequate the framework of the AoA is in dealing with the 
challenges faced by developing countries.  
 
3.2. Is the Framework of Policies and commitments of the Agreement on Agriculture 
Adequate for Developing Countries?  
  
The AoA has been subject to several criticisms.  A valid criticism is that there are 
imbalances in the AoA because industrialized countries have been able to secure 
exemptions for some of their policies (like the Blue Box) and were allowed to continue 
using significant amounts of expenditures for domestic support and export subsidies.  
Rich countries have the legal room and the resources to implement the variety of policies 
allowed under that legal text, while developing countries, although having legal room of 
maneuver, lack the needed financial resources.   
 
However, other criticisms of the AoA are less convincing.  For instance, some have 
suggested that the WTO legal texts tightly constrain developing countries in legal terms,  
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not allowing them to implement policies needed for their economic development, to 
combat poverty or to attain food security.  In a similar vein, it has been argued that the 
legal exemptions allowed for developing countries are of no use to them, mainly because 
the policies permitted are very difficult to implement due to the financial, technical, and 
human resource requirements (Solagral, 1999; Murphy, 1999; and UNCTAD, 2000).  
Usually, the final conclusion of this line of analysis is that developing countries need 
additional “flexibility” mainly in terms of the levels of protection allowed.  Some of 
those arguments appear to suggest that trade protection measures are simpler to 
implement institutionally and have no costs to the economy. 
 
A counter argument sees no significant legal constraints in the AoA for developing 
countries to adopt a variety of interventions to support agriculture, particularly regarding 
policies and programs that really improve competitiveness and equity, given the 
resources they possess.  Also, the argument that legal exemptions allowed for developing 
countries have a cost, focuses only on the impact of budgetary outlays paid by the 
citizens as taxpayers, but ignores that tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are equivalent 
of taxes paid by the citizens as consumers.  Trade protection also has concrete costs, and 
the distributive implications may be regressive in that import taxes have larger impacts 
on poor consumers, and mostly benefit larger producers. 
 
A common mistake is to view import taxes as revenues paid by foreigners and collected 
only by governments.  In fact, economic analysis shows that consumers usually pay the 
larger percentage of the sum of government revenues and associated transfers, and 
producers generally collect the larger percentage of those payments.  Only a fraction of 
total consumption of food products is imported in developing countries (typically not 
more than 10-15 percent, and in many cases less than that on average; see Diaz-Bonilla, 
2001).  But border restrictions increase prices for the total amount of the consumed 
product, which includes the other 85-90 percent in domestically produced food resulting 
in a direct transfer from consumers to producers.  Only in special cases (such as when 
more than 50 percent of the consumed product is imported) would the government be the 
main direct recipient of the revenues generated by border protection.    
 
This same fact limits also the suggestion of using the receipts from import taxes to 
subsidize food consumption of the poor (FAO, 1999; paper 6; footnote 4).  To the extent 
that the volume of taxed commodities is only a fraction of total domestic consumption, 
and that the poor population may represent, as a whole, even though not necessarily per 
capita, a sizable percentage of that domestic consumption, government revenues from 
taxing imported commodities would typically not be enough to compensate poor 
consumers.  The case of developed countries, where the incidence of poverty is smaller 
and which have additional fiscal resources, is different.  They can tax consumers in 
general with border protection for food, but then, at the same time, are able to subsidize 
poor consumers through different targeted policies financed by general revenues.   
 
But, even if the negative impact on equity from the consumption side can be 
compensated and corrected, that would still leave untouched the unequal distribution of  
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revenues on the production side, where by the nature of border protection, the bulk of the 
implicit tax is collected by larger producers who have more production to sell.   
 
In summary, the proposals to increase border protection for food security or rural 
development reasons are equivalent to implementing a sales tax on food, with most of the 
revenues redistributed to larger farmers.  
  
Also it is not necessarily follow that the institutional requirements to run efficient and 
honest customs administrations that can adequately manage those border measures are 
less exacting than organizing, for example, an efficient system of agricultural research 
and extension.  Whatever the institutional requirements, it is obvious that the 
interventions allowed under the AoA without restrictions, such as research, extension, 
infrastructure, and irrigation, to name a few, are the real foundations for increases in 
production, productivity, and competitiveness.  Trade protection measures, on the other 
hand, are mostly internal transfers (and largely regressive in the case of food), without 
any direct link to the real sources of agricultural productivity growth.   
 
A related issue is the argument for increased flexibility.  In trade, and other, negotiations 
the parties usually try to limit other peoples’ options while attempting to retain flexibility 
for oneself.  But it seems dubious that developing countries be granted ample flexibility, 
while industrialized countries renounce theirs.  Of course, in any balanced negotiation, all 
parties would become committed to some mutually agreed common rules.  Developing 
countries, as weaker players in the global arena, need an international legal system that 
limits the ability of larger countries to act unilaterally.  The argument that the WTO is 
completely dominated by industrialized countries and by transnational corporations, fails 
to recognize the fact that the latter would have even more power without an international 
legal framework.  
 
Moreover, there are arguments why some lack of flexibility may be beneficial to 
developing countries (Oyejide, 2000).  First, the implementation of internationally 
negotiated rules may limit the power of special interests and arbitrary government 
measures within developing countries, helping to strengthen domestic legal and 
institutional frameworks (Diaz-Bonilla, 2000).  Second, it has been shown that 
investment is in part related to the stability and certainty of the policy framework 
(Campos, Lien and Pradhan, 1999; Solimano, 1989).  A legal framework, internationally 
sanctioned, that limits flexibility and uncertainty should help investment. 
 
A separate issue (discussed later in this section) is whether developing countries should 
take a more deliberate and slow approach to reduction of trade barriers, particularly until 
the glaring imbalances between industrial and developing countries are eliminated.  There 
is a compelling argument to be made that the AoA—with the legal possibilities allowed 
to industrialized countries to subsidize exports, to provide trade-distorting domestic 
support, and to otherwise engage in protectionist agricultural policies—still leaves 
developing countries at a disadvantage in world markets.  Therefore, an important issue is 
whether Green Box and other domestic support measures should be further tightened  
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because industrialized countries, with their financial, human, and institutional 
capabilities, would abuse them.  
 
Still, this does not detract from the main issue that to achieve the objectives of 
agricultural development and poverty alleviation, developing countries must design 
adequate domestic policies and investment programs in human capital, infrastructure, 
technology, regularization and expansion of land ownership by small producers and 
landless workers, and, in general, promote the adequate functioning of product and factor 
markets.  The AoA does not restrict all those policies.  The problem for developing 
countries is not the lack of legal room for the implementation of efficient and equitable 
policies, but the need for funds (at the national and international levels) to be able to 
implement those policies, and the existence of still high levels of subsidization and 
protection of the agricultural sector of industrialized countries.   
 
This discussion has implications for the negotiating positions of the developing countries.  
It has been suggested that those countries can adopt an “offensive” strategy, such as 
trying to open up markets in industrialized countries and limit their ability to use funds 
from the Treasuries to compete against farmers in non-subsidizing countries; or a 
“defensive” strategy, such as asking for equivalent levels of protection and the possibility 
of utilizing subsidies that now industrialized countries have (Konandreas, 2000).  In 
analyzing the merits of each approach (or a combination of both), there are at least two 
considerations that developing countries must keep in mind.  First, they would need to be 
realistic about the resources they have to carry out the policies they are seeking in the 
negotiations.  If in adopting a defensive strategy developing countries are asking for legal 
room to apply subsidies that they will not be able to use later for lack of money, their 
negotiating position may be very weak.  Industrialized countries will be only too happy to 
grant developing countries concessions that will have no effective implications, while, in 
return, extracting a price for the “concessions” granted.  For instance, proposals that 
suggest a de minimis of 20 percent of total agricultural production for developing 
countries should be compared with the total budget of the Ministries of Agriculture or 
similar agencies (after discounting salaries), to see if enough fiscal resources to 
implement the concessions requested exist.  Second, developing countries should 
consider the substantial legal room they already have under the AoA before asking for a 
Development Box or Food Safety Box, as if they were new, additional things.  In the first 
instance, developing countries should avoid asking for something they will not be able to 
implement for lack of funding, and in the second instance, developing countries should 
recognize the legal room that they already have, and avoid paying a negotiating price for 
clauses that are similar to existing ones but have been repackaged as new boxes for 
developing countries.  In most cases, small changes in the language may accommodate 
the key concerns of developing countries (as argued below).  The adequate negotiating 
position would be to ask for some clarifications in the current texts, but not make it a 
major issue, that later can be invoked by industrialized countries as concessions during 
negotiations the latter may want.  
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3.3.Agriculture and Growth in Developing Countries 
 
In the 1970s, developing countries came to question the wisdom of adopting an ISI 
(import substitution industrialization) development strategy (Little et al., 1970, Balassa et 
al. 1971, Krueger, 1978).  With this shift, there is wide agreement on the importance of 
achieving a healthy agricultural sector to support any successful development strategy.  
This is especially important for poor developing countries where 2/3 of the population 
live in rural areas, and agriculture generates about 1/4 of the GDP, and a substantial 
percentage of employment and exports (World Bank Development Indicators, 2001).  An 
adequate economic strategy should include not only the elimination of the bias against 
the agricultural sector in the general macroeconomic and trade policy framework, but 
also, and as important, increased investments in rural development, agricultural 
productivity, and poverty alleviation.  Different studies have shown that an agricultural-
led growth strategy may have larger dynamic multipliers for the rest of the economy than 
other alternatives in poor developing countries (Delgado et al. 1999).  Even in the success 
stories of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia, a common characteristic is that 
they invested strongly, and very early, in rural and agricultural development (McCalla, 
2000).  
 
However, in the context of the WTO negotiations, the question is the likely contribution 
of trade to agricultural growth and the overall development strategy.  In several 
industrialized countries some farmers’ organizations have been asking for support to the 
sector in an inward-oriented strategy, criticizing for instance changes in the CAP (such as 
reduction in support prices) that have been predicated on the need to become competitive 
in export markets (see for instance, Coordination Paysanne Européenne, 2001).  In 
general, however, inward-orientated strategies tend to be associated with lower growth 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995).  Conversely, Scandizzo (1998) shows, in a sample of 71 
developing countries, covering the period 1969-1991, that agricultural exports are 
strongly and positively correlated with overall economic growth.  Therefore, if 
development of the agricultural sector is very important in developing countries, 
particularly the poorest ones, and agricultural exports appear an important component of 
that development, then for those countries a key concern should be access to competitive 
international markets (McCalla, 2000).       
 
Of course, differences in agrifood export performance by developing countries depends 
on several factors, such as income and population growth, natural resource base and 
climate, and technological progress, as well as of economic policies, both in 
industrialized and developing countries.  The importance of the WTO legal framework 
and the current negotiations is, precisely, the likely impact on trade and agricultural 
policies worldwide.  From the point of view of the developing countries it is important to 
distinguish their own policies, from those of the industrialized countries.  
 
Different studies before the beginning of the Uruguay Round in the mid 1980’s aimed at 
quantifying the impact of agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries.  They 
usually predicted substantial positive effects on developing countries incomes, 
production, and exports of agricultural and agro industrial products from an eventual  
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reduction of tariffs and other forms of agricultural protection in industrialized countries 
(Valdés and Zietz, 1980; Goldin and Knudsen, 1990).   
 
Other studies during the Uruguay Round negotiations concluded that agricultural and 
agro industrial production in developing countries, as well as their net welfare, would 
increase if agricultural protectionism in industrialized countries was reduced.  But some 
of the studies also raised the possibility of negative welfare effects for a subset of 
developing countries, mostly in Africa and net importers of agricultural products, due to 
adverse changes in the terms of trade (Sharma et al., 1996).  Other analyses, though, have 
argued that even for those countries suffering adverse trade effects, the domestic policy 
framework is still more relevant for general welfare results (Ingco, 1997).  Also, 
simulations of gains by developing countries resulting from agricultural trade 
liberalization have usually lumped fruit and vegetables together with other subsectors, 
which may have led to underestimation of the benefits, considering the growing 
importance of this group of products in LDC exports.  For instance, Islam (1990) found 
significant gains for developing countries of liberalization of world trade in fruit and 
vegetables.  Yet, even after the Uruguay Round negotiations, production of fruit and 
vegetables remains highly protected in several Industrialized countries, mainly on a 
seasonal basis, allowing entry with lower levels of tariffs only when there is no domestic 
production (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995). 
 
The combination of domestic support, market protection and export subsidies by 
industrialized countries depressed world prices and reduced market opportunities for a 
variety of food products.  This hurt developing countries that were net exporters but it has 
also been argued that such outcome may have helped the balance of payments position of 
developing countries that were net importers of those products (Koester and Bale, 1990; 
Sarris, 1991).  This view, however, does not address the distributional impact within 
developing countries between consumers and producers, and across types of households.  
Simulation models used to evaluate world agricultural liberalization have not 
disaggregated household and farm sectors in ways that would have allowed better 
understanding of the distributive implications of the policies suggested.  This is an issue 
that IFPRI and other institutions are analyzing in greater detail.   
   
Moreover, even though agricultural trade policies in industrialized countries may have 
reduced the import bill of net importing countries, it can be argued that those same 
policies have had a stifling effect on agricultural and agro industrial production in 
developing countries, regardless of their net trade position.  Considering that those 
sectors are the main economic activities in many developing countries, particularly poor 
ones, and that such activities usually have significant growth multipliers for the whole 
economy (Delgado et al, 1998), the level of non-realized dynamic benefits for those 
countries may have been substantial. 
 
Given that framework, then, there are different areas of the negotiations that appear 
important for agricultural growth in developing countries.   
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First, a specific trade practice that has been widely criticized as unfair and disruptive of 
international trade is the use of export subsidies.  In complete contrast with industrial 
goods, this practice has not yet been completely eliminated for agricultural products, 
many of which are processed products.  Therefore, the differential treatment of export 
subsidies under the current agreements of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is not 
only between primary agriculture and industry, but also between those industries based 
on agricultural raw materials (for which export subsidies are allowed) and the rest of the 
manufacturing sector (for which those unfair trade practices have been banned) (Diaz-
Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  Industrialized countries have been the main source of 
subsidized agricultural exports over the years: from 1986-1997, those export subsidies 
amounted to about 135 billion US dollars (see Leetmaa and Ackerman, 1999, for 
European and US export subsidies).  That is the equivalent of almost 13 percent of the 
value of all agricultural exports by the developing countries of Africa, LAC and Asia 
(minus China) combined, during the period (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  Agricultural 
export subsidies have proved very disruptive both for developing countries that are net 
agricultural exporters, but also for the agricultural producers in net importing developing 
countries, which are displaced by this unfair competition.  An important percentage of 
those export subsidies do not go to the poorest countries, and some of the products 
covered are not necessarily those that may be more directly linked to the alleviation of 
food security problems.  
 
A related subject is the operation of state trading enterprises, which may require 
increasing disciplines and transparency on practices that may be equivalent to subsidies 
or dumping on the export side, or hidden trade barriers, on the import side.  Finally, it is 
important to integrate in a unified framework the disciplines related to the continuum of 
transactions involving agricultural products, particularly the interface of export subsidies 
with food aid and export credits.   
 
Developing countries are asking that the special and differential treatment for them 
exempting subsidies related to marketing costs and internal transport and freight charges 
in Article 9 d) and e) be maintained. 
  
At the same time, developing countries have an interest in stricter disciplines on export 
taxes and export controls, practices that may exacerbate price fluctuations in world 
markets and limit access to food. 
 
A second set of issues is the opportunities for expanded market access.  They will depend 
on increasing the volume of imports allowed under the current regime of tariff-rate 
quotas (TRQ); on a more transparent and equitable administration of those TRQs; on 
simplification of some complex tariff structures that include combinations of normal and 
ad-valorem tariffs, complexity which is compounded by seasonal adjustments in some 
cases; on further reduction of tariffs, particularly those still very high in some key 
products, such as fruits and vegetables, sugar, meat and dairy products, among others; 
and on completing the process of tariffication in the cases where exemptions were 
granted.   
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Within market access, the elimination of tariff escalation is an important subject for 
developing countries: this practice by importing countries, of applying higher tariff on 
processed agricultural imports than on raw products, undermines their possibilities of 
generating local employment and increasing the value added of their products.  Tariff 
escalation has been discussed at least since the Kennedy Round (Yeats, 1974).  Although 
this characteristic of the tariff structure has diminished somewhat after the Uruguay 
Round, significant levels of tariff escalation will still remain after the full implementation 
of the Uruguay Round (Lindland, 1997; OECD, 1997,).  In particular, OECD (1997) 
documents important tariff escalation in coffee and cocoa products, which can in part 
explain the increasing share of industrialized countries in the international trade of 
processed goods using those raw materials (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  
 
Another issue of market access is the continuation of the Special Safeguard established in 
the AoA.  It was allowed for products that underwent tariffication, but it had to be 
specifically designated for the eligible products.  A total of 38 countries have established 
SSG for about 6072 tariff items; about 3600 tariff items correspond to industrialized 
countries (WTO, G/AG/NG/S/9, June 6, 2000).  Developing countries, by and large, 
resorted to binding commitments as an alternative to apply the tariff equivalent of the 
existing border measures, and therefore could not invoke the SSG.   
 
As another manifestation of the offensive/defensive dichotomy, while some developing 
countries want the SSG terminated, others are asking to be able to use it.  In general, the 
SSG acts as a variable levy, is not transparent, and it has the potential of being very 
disruptive of trade.  Probably for developing countries it would be more adequate to ask 
for the termination of the SSG, while reserving the possibility of a streamlined safeguard 
for a very limited number of products for food security reasons only, or when important 
components of the rural population are affected (see below).  
 
A final and delicate matter related to market access is the erosion of preferences for a 
number of developing countries that have special market access arrangements with 
industrialized countries.  For poor income developing countries, the preferential access 
usually represents a large percentage of agricultural exports and sectoral value added.  
Some have argued that the continuation of those preferences is already under threat for 
products such as sugar, both in the US and the EU.  In the US market, Mexico has 
expanded access under NAFTA, reaching total liberalization by 2007/8, while in the EU 
market, the inclusion of Eastern European countries, will reduce the margin of 
preferences (ABARE, 1999).  The EU is also struggling to implement the WTO rulings 
related to bananas.  
 
Yet, whatever the uncertain prospects for some of those preferential arrangements, there 
are several options to compensate poor countries for the erosion in preferences.  In some 
cases, changing the way TRQs operate could compensate the erosion of preferences for 
some time.  The most obvious changes would be granting the licenses to the exporting 
countries instead of giving them to importers, and reducing to zero the in quota tariff for 
those countries.  Another possibility is to calculate the value of the trade preferences and 
transform them into an annual payment to the exporting countries.  This means extending  
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to the poor developing countries affected the logic applied to compensate domestic 
producers in industrialized countries for the reduction in direct support.  Considering that 
a policy of liberalization acts as a tax cut for consumers in the liberalizing countries, 
recapturing part of those funds may serve to finance the compensations to poor 
developing countries for the lost access.   
 
A third set of issues relates to domestic support.  The final agreement reached at the 
Uruguay Round was weakened when the measure of support was transformed from a 
product-based one to an aggregate value for the whole agricultural sector, and when the 
main domestic subsidies of the European Union and the US (at that time) were kept 
outside the disciplines in what was called the "blue box".  With the changes in the 1996 
Farm Bill in the US, the most important user of Blue Box measures is the European 
Union. 
 
On the other hand, many developing countries have dismantled or significantly reduced 
their own domestic support for agricultural producers, mainly because of fiscal 
constraints and concerns about inefficient policies, usually as part of structural 
adjustment programs supported by financial international organizations and aid donors.  
But the possibilities that these countries, and the world, benefit from following their 
comparative advantages are drastically thwarted by the subsidies of developed countries.  
As further disciplines in this regard some of the proposals include the tightening of the 
criteria for the Green Box, the reduction of the measure of support by product and the 
elimination of the exemptions considered under the Blue Box.   
 
Some countries have suggested a cap to all, or a specially defined subset, of domestic 
support measures as a percentage of the total value of agricultural production (WTO, 
2000a and 2000b).  The argument is that a uniform cap defined in percentages would 
contribute to level a playing field that is now heavily tilted in favor of industrialized 
countries, which have the legal room under the WTO and the money to distort production 
and trade in their favor.  
 
Least developed and low-income developing countries should still be allowed special and 
differential treatment in this regard.  In general, the negotiations of the Uruguay Round 
allowed developing countries to maintain the great majority of agricultural and social 
policies linked to poverty alleviation and agricultural development.  For low-income 
developing countries the main concern here should be the provision of adequate levels of 
technical assistance and financial support to help develop their agricultural sector, as 
indicated in the Ministerial Declaration on the subject.  
 
A fourth set of issues relates to sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, as well as other 
technical, quality, and environmental standards.  These measures can be, and have been, 
used as barriers to trade.  Concerns about the possibility that the liberalization of 
agricultural trade achieved with the Agreement on Agriculture could be negated by 
manipulation of those regulations led to the negotiation during the Uruguay Round of two 
separate documents.  The first was the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Measures, directly related to human, plant and animal health issues linked to trade in  
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agricultural products.  The second was the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
which covered technical regulations and standards, and conformity assessment 
procedures.   
 
Developing countries have complained over the years about SPS measures and 
inspections that tend to become stricter when there are agricultural surpluses in the 
domestic markets of Industrialized countries.  They have also criticized the long periods 
required by Industrialized countries to complete the pest and disease studies needed to 
allow the import of new agricultural products from Developing countries (see Matthews, 
1994, for other SPS issues).  Since the Uruguay Round Agreement, and in the 
preliminary discussions related to the continuation of the negotiations mandated in 
Article 20 of the Agreement of Agriculture, some developing countries have argued for 
greater flexibility in the implementation of their obligations under the SPS Agreement.  
Finger and Schuler, 2000 have calculated the relatively important budgetary costs that 
some of the operational requirements of different WTO commitments (and not only the 
SPS Agreement) may impose on low income developing countries.  They argued for 
taking a second look at those WTO regulatory issues in order to align them with the real 
developmental needs of developing countries, as separate from just complying with WTO 
legal texts.   
 
For instance, SPS issues related to human health should be approached as part of the 
improvements needed to protect the local population from food-borne diseases and not 
only as a way to comply with trade regulations.  Similarly, tackling animal and plant 
health problems must be seen as part of SPS requirements to increase production and 
productivity in developing countries.  If the costs to implement the administrative 
machinery needed to deal with SPS issues are seen by developing countries as simply 
“how best to allow poultry imports from industrialized countries” (as an African 
participant of an SPS technical assistance course sponsored by industrialized countries 
indicated), then the complaints about the need of flexibility appear justified.  
 
As a general proposition, it seems imbalanced to ask low-income countries to devote to 
the administrative machinery required to implement WTO obligations resources that 
represent, as a percentage of the GDP, a larger share than what industrialized countries 
assign to similar functions.  
 
On the other hand, a strong SPS framework may be important for developing countries, 
not only because a competitive export position requires establishing and maintaining the 
sanitary and quality requirements for their products, but also as a way of improving 
health conditions in the developing countries, to the extent that best practices and 
standards would then be more widely applied in those countries.  Probably the most 
adequate approach for developing countries is to insist on receiving the technical and 
financial assistance considered in the SPS Agreement (Articles 29 and 30) to build and 
improve their own systems of quality control and health and safety standards.  These 
systems should be centered on their own needs to improve health and sanitary domestic 
conditions, and the regulatory burdens of compliance should to the very least not  
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represent shares of the GDP larger than what industrialized countries devote to similar 
functions.    
3.4.Agriculture, Poverty, and Food Security  
 
Introduction. Increased access to international trade opportunities is usually associated 
with higher growth rates for the economy, in general, and for the agricultural sector in 
particular.  Vice-versa, closed economies relying on the dynamics of small domestic 
markets have tended to show slower and halting growth rates.  In turn, high and stable 
growth rates have been commonly associated with reductions in poverty rates  (see 
Lipton and Ravallion, 1995, and the recent reviews in Eastwood and Lipton, 2001, and 
Osmani, 2001).  In particular, if countries are following their comparative advantages, 
international trade by labor-abundant poor developing countries, should help increase 
employment and wages, further alleviating poverty.  To the extent that poverty is the 
main cause of food insecurity, then international trade opportunities should also help with 
food security concerns.  The expansion of trade in goods and services over the last 
decades, along with the decline in food prices resulting from technological advance, has 
led to sharp reductions of the incidence of the total food bill of developing countries as 
percentage of total exports (Figure 4).  Also the fact that food consumption variability in 
individual countries is far smaller than food production variability shows the contribution 
of trade to food security (Tables 15 and 16).  
 
Figure 4.  Ratio of food imports over total exports 
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Yet, it is always possible to construct scenarios under which trade may have less benign 
effects on poverty and food security.  Much depends on the level, inclusiveness, and 
stability of the growth rate.  While poverty in the developing world declines rapidly with 
distributionally neutral growth, deviations from neutrality may wipe out those gains 
(Lipton and Ravallion, 1995).  Furthermore, even with neutral growth at higher rates, if 
its variability increases generating a greater likelihood of crises, then the poor may face 
significant additional downside risks, with the prospect of long-lasting damage to their 
low levels of human and physical capital (i.e. crises may force poor families to sell 
productive assets, increase the possibility of illness, or have their children drop out of 
school) (see for instance, Addison and Demery, 1989; Lipton and Ravallion, 1995).   
 
Within the agricultural sector, criticisms to different developments such as the Green 
Revolution, the increase in commercialization, and now the expansion of international 
trade, and more generally the process of globalization, centered on the possibility of 
negative effects on the welfare of poor producers and poor consumers, through diverse 
channels.  A moderately negative scenario would point out to the limitations of the poor 
to have access to the technology and other resources that would allow them to participate 
profitably in expanding domestic or international markets.  This exclusion may lead to 
the possibility of worsening income distribution, but not necessarily to increases in 
absolute poverty.   
 
A more worrisome situation would be if the poor became absolutely worse off, and not 
only in relative terms.  Usually the arguments in this regard suggest that the process of 
technological innovation or expansion of market opportunities may reinforce the power 
of already dominant actors (large landowners, big commercial enterprises) allowing them 
to extract further incomes from the poor or to expropriate their assets.  In terms of food 
security, the claims of negative effects usually revolve around the possibility of cash or 
export production displacing staple crops, and/or that women, usually the anchor for 
households’ food security, may end up with less decision-making power and less 
resources due to the technological or commercial changes.    
 
Different studies of the Green Revolution, and domestic and international 
commercialization, tend to paint a more positive view of the process, usually showing 
advances for the poor, due to production, employment and food price effects (Hazell and 
Ramaswamy, 1991; Von Braun and Kennedy, 1994; IFAD 2001, among others), 
although recognizing that uniform attainment of benign outcomes is by no means 
guaranteed.  Usually complementary policies are needed to increase physical and human 
capital owned by the poor, to build general infrastructure and services (roads, 
communications, transportation), to ensure that markets operate competitively, and to 
eliminate institutional, political or social biases that discriminate against the poor (IFAD, 
2001).  
 
The question in the context of the WTO negotiations is whether the current AoA and its 
possible future modifications would allow or limit the range of policies needed to make 
sure that increased trade opportunities lead to adequate rates of inclusive, sustainable and 
stable growth, contributing to reductions of poverty and improvements in food security.   
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Answering this question requires first a brief review of some policy discussions related to 
the role of agriculture in the development process.   
 
Agricultural policy dilemmas. There is a permanent tension in agricultural policies 
between the desire of maintaining high prices for producers and keeping low prices for 
consumers.  Generally speaking, industrialized and developing countries have tried to 
solve this old policy dilemma rather differently.  Rich countries have used transfers from 
consumers (through border protection) and taxpayers (through budgetary outlays) to 
maintain high prices for producers.  For instance, according to the OECD, in 1998 for the 
products considered in those calculations, producers in Japan received equivalent prices 
that were 172 percent above world prices, the European Union 83 percent, and the United 
States 28 percent.  For OECD countries as a whole, equivalent domestic prices exceeded 
world prices by about 60 percent, with the largest difference corresponding to Norway 
(229 percent above world prices).  In the case of Japan, more than 90 percent of the 
transfer was paid by consumers through border protection and the rest by taxpayers as 
budgetary outlays, while in the case of the EU and USA the shares were about equal for 
consumer and taxpayer transfers (OECD, 1999). 
  
Developing countries, on the other hand, followed historically policies of low agricultural 
prices to help urban populations and further the process of industrialization.  Agriculture 
role in development was conceived as supporting the needs of industrialization in four 
ways (Johnston and Mellor 1961).  First, by the transfer of labor surpluses: workers 
supposedly unemployed in agriculture would be transferred to industry (see especially 
Lewis 1954).  Agriculture would also provide food ("wage goods") and raw materials to 
keep salaries and other costs low in the industrial sector.  Savings from the agricultural 
sector would be taxed away to sustain investment in industry and infrastructure.  Finally, 
the agricultural sector had to generate foreign currency to pay for the importation of 
capital goods and industrial inputs.   
 
But by the mid-1960s, several concerns arose about the adequacy of a development 
strategy that discriminated against the agricultural sector.  Schultz (1964), in an 
influential book, argued that farmers in developing countries were "poor but efficient", 
reacting with economic rationality to changes in prices and incentives.  If agricultural 
resources were efficiently utilized, no gains could be made by transferring labor and 
savings to other sectors.  A better strategy would be to support the agricultural sector 
through investments in technology and physical and human capital formation in rural 
areas.  The idea of a technological solution to the rural problem came to infuse the Green 
Revolution of the 1970s. 
 
Other studies in the 1970s evaluated critically the development strategies and trade 
regimes based on import substitution industrialization in a number of developing 
countries (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; Balassa, 1971; and Krueger, 1978).  They 
argued that ISI had a negative impact on economic efficiency and growth.  Also, 
arguments about inelastic international demand ("elasticity pessimism") and deteriorating 
terms of trade began to be challenged (for an overview of those debates see Balassa, 
1986).  




It was also clear that poverty alleviation in developing countries was impaired by policies 
that protected capital-intensive industrialization and discriminated against agriculture, 
negatively affecting employment and income distribution.  The obvious realization that 
the poor in developing countries were concentrated mainly in rural areas, led to the 
conclusion that if poverty alleviation was to be an important objective of economic 
policy, then greater attention should be given to agricultural and rural development.  
Chenery et al (1974) presented the case for an investment program centered on the poor, 
especially in rural areas (see also Lipton, 1977, who argued against the urban bias in 
common development strategies since the 1950s).   
 
During the 1980's, rather than the investment approach in the rural areas and the poor, the 
emphasis shifted to the need for changes in the framework of development and 
macroeconomic policies.  In particular, the combination of overvalued exchange rates, 
protection of domestic industry, and (often) explicit taxation of agricultural exports, were 
criticized for severely hindered agricultural growth, especially in very poor countries.  If 
those were the main problems, then faster and more equitable growth would not happen 
until the general policy framework was revised.  The policy recommendation was to 
eliminate inefficient industrial protectionism, to avoid the overvaluation of the exchange 
rate, to phase out export taxes on agriculture, and to reduce government’s involvement in 
agricultural markets through inefficient and many times contradictory interventions 
(World Bank, 1986).  At the macroeconomic level, policies underscored the need of 
having domestic absorption in line with production (eventually expanded by sustainable 
external financing).  These policies, when implemented, have usually been part of IMF 
stabilization programs and World Bank structural adjustment programs.   
 
The results in terms of growth and equity of those programs continue to be debated (see 
Dorosh and Sahn, 2000), but the relevant point here is that recent research indicates that 
the effects of such policy reforms have been to greatly reduce or, in some cases, eliminate 
the past policy bias against agriculture in many developing countries (Bautista, Robinson, 
Tarp, and Wobst, 1998).  Although further improvements in domestic policies are still 
needed in different developing countries, now the focus in those countries could turn 
again to investment policies and projects in the agricultural sector, focusing on human 
capital, land, water, property rights, management, technology, infrastructure, 
strengthening organizations of small farmers, and other forms of expansion of social 
capital and political participation for the poor.  Such an agricultural focus was largely 
abandoned during the period when improvements in the overall development strategy 
emphasizing economy-wide trade and macroeconomic policies appeared paramount 
(Diaz Bonilla and Robinson, 1999).  
 
The question, in the context of the current negotiations, is whether after having first 
discriminated against the agricultural sector, and then changed to a more neutral stance 
(where the focus can then be placed on investments in physical and human capital), 
developing countries should move even further towards protection of the agricultural 
sector, adopting in fact policies that are the opposite of the previous low-price 
agricultural policies.  In fact, some proposals, implicitly or explicitly suggest taxing  
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consumers in developing countries to support producers, basically through higher levels 
of border protection.  An extreme form of the argument in favor of producers and against 
consumers is presented in Madeley, 2000.  He argues, “Consumers may appear to gain 
from cheap food imports.  But they only do so if they have money to buy, which many 
people in developing countries don’t have” (Madeley, 2000; p. 8).  This way of wishing 
away the policy dilemma mentioned above basically ignores the reality of the poor as a 
consumer.  Poor households spend a large part of their incomes in food (above 50 percent 
for a large number of poor developing countries; see FAO 1999b).  Even when they are 
small farmers, the poor ones tend to be net buyers of food, and together with landless 
rural workers, may be affected by higher prices, although the net effect will depend on 
the strength of employment effects (IFAD, 2001).  
 
At the same time it is also important to notice the steady shift in the locus of poverty, 
food insecurity, and malnutrition from rural to urban areas that different developing 
countries have been experiencing (Ruel et al. 1998, Ruel et al. 1999, Haddad et al. 1999, 
and Garrett and Ruel 2000).  Urbanization in developing countries is posing new 
questions regarding economic and social policies in general, and also in relation to the 
impact of trade and trade policies on poverty and food security.  A similar profile of trade 
protection (or trade liberalization) will have different implications for developing 
countries with important contingents of urban poor affected by food insecurity, than for 
other poor countries where a majority of the population affected by poverty and food 
insecurity lives in rural areas and works in agricultural production.  Of course there are 
also vulnerable rural groups which are net consumers of food, and for which taxes on 
food imports may have impacts more comparable to food-insecure urban groups, 
depending on the balance between possibly higher incomes and larger food costs (Diaz-
Bonilla et al, 2000).  In fact, Fan, Hazell, and Thorat (1999) have found that higher 
agricultural prices are positively correlated with rural poverty in India (i.e. poverty goes 
up when agricultural prices increases), while Fan (2000), found the opposite for China.  
Fan argues, “This difference comes from the fact that even poor farmers in China are net 
suppliers of agricultural products, while most of rural poor in India are net buyers” (Fan, 
2000).  The impact of prices then depends on the structure of farming system and the 
nature of poverty and food insecurity (see also IFAD, 2001).  
 
While mostly rural countries may be more concerned about food insecurity in the 
countryside and the impact of agricultural imports on poor agricultural producers, in 
developing countries with larger urban populations, and where conceivably an important 
percentage of poor and food insecure groups may be urban dwellers, there is a clear 
trade-off for policies aimed at agricultural trade protection: they may maintain higher 
incomes for poor producers, but they may also act as a tax on poor consumers (both 
effects depending on other policies and the interaction of markets and institutions). As 
mentioned before, the case of vulnerable rural groups that are net consumers of food must 
also be considered.  In general, an import tax has a bigger incidence on poor consumers 
(who spend a greater percentage of their incomes on food), and is received mostly by 
bigger agricultural producers, which have larger quantities of products to sell.   
 
  
  39 
 
 
This issue is further complicated by dynamic considerations, which may affect rural-
urban migration.  A policy completely tilted towards low prices for the consumer would 
damage the rural sector and exacerbate migration to the cities.  Therefore, the issue is a 
balanced rural-urban policy, which includes but goes beyond food prices, and should 
consider the short and long-term implications of those policies.  
 
Several developing countries have indicated their concern that further liberalization of 
agricultural and trade policies may create problems for their large agricultural 
populations, where poverty is still concentrated (WTO 2000a, and 2000b).  There may be 
some valid arguments for holding the line, at least for some time, on current levels of 
protection in poor developing countries.  One is not to reduce them until the higher levels 
of protection and subsidization in industrialized countries are first eliminated.  The World 
Bank report on agriculture (1986) advised developing countries to live with those 
subsidies, taking advantage of lower prices for their consumers.  As argued before, the 
problem with this advice is that even though export and domestic subsidies in 
industrialized countries may reduce the import bill of net importing countries, those same 
policies would hamper the full dynamic benefits that a sustainable agricultural sector and 
agro-industrialization process can have on the whole economy, given a proper framework 
of domestic economic policies in developing countries.     
 
A second reason for adopting a slower pace to the reduction of tariffs in poor developing 
countries with problems of food security and large rural populations is the possible 
negative impact on poor producers: they live on the edge of survival in many cases and 
cannot be subject to drastic shocks that may undermine their survival strategies 
irreparably, forcing poor families to sell productive assets, increasing the possibility of 
illness, and so on (see for instance, Addison and Demery, 1989; Lipton and Ravallion, 
1995).   
 
Another argument for holding the line on current levels of protection in poor countries 
may be related to fiscal matters: the importance of trade taxes as an important source of 
government revenues should be taken into account.  Yet, some forms of trade 
liberalization (such as moving from quotas to non-prohibitive tariffs), or as the result of 
increases in international trade, may lead to larger government revenues.  
 
In summary, the policy dilemma between high prices for producers (which would help 
poor, small farmers, but also big ones, and the latter proportionally more) and low prices 
for consumers (which would benefit poor consumers, but not only them) cannot be 
wished away, and has to be faced by every developing country.  As a general rule, given 
the important growth multiplier effects of agriculture especially in poor developing 
countries, policies that ignore or, even worse, discriminate against agriculture must be 
avoided.  Trade neutral or slightly favorable policies to agriculture appear to be the best 
strategy, but always considering the possible negative effects on poor consumers.  A 
possible approach for developing countries in this regard is to negotiate possible 
reductions from the higher bound tariffs rather than utilizing the lower applied tariffs, as 
some industrialized countries have suggested.  
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Food Security and Poverty. Food security concerns have been raised in the current WTO 
agricultural negotiations by both industrialized and developing countries.  For richer 
countries that are net food importers, the discussion centers, in part, on whether there 
exists some “adequate” proportion between food imports and domestic food production, 
and whether the continuation of the negotiating process may place undue constraints on 
attaining the desired ratio of imports over domestic production.  Those ratios may be 
linked to some notion of insurance in a changing world, and/or national autonomy to be 
able to confront outside pressures.  It is much less clear what would be the basis for 
claiming food security concerns in the case of industrialized countries that are net 
exporters of different food products.  In the case of developing countries, the discussion 
is broader, including whether important policy objectives such as elimination of poverty 
and hunger (as cause and consequence of food insecurity) may have been helped or 
hindered by the current Agreement on Agriculture, and whether further negotiations may 
improve upon the existing text or will further compromise the attainment of those 
objectives in poor countries (Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000).   
 
For the coming negotiations to consider in greater detail food security concerns under 
WTO rules, there are two issues that need to be addressed.  The first is the relevance of 
the current classification of countries (developed/developing, LDCs, and NFIDCs) with 
respect to their food security status.   
 
The second issue is whether the current legal texts, which define WTO commitments on 
the basis of those categories of countries, really address the issue of food security through 
that differential treatment.  Both questions are related: if the categories are badly defined 
to capture food security concerns, then it is unlikely that the differential treatment under 
WTO rules will deal with those concerns in a meaningful way.  But even if these 
categories capture the variety in the situations of food (in) security, the question 
regarding the adequacy of current and future WTO rules and commitments to adequately 
treat those differences must still be answered. 
  
The first question was explored in detail in a recent study (Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000), and 
some of the legal aspects raised by the second question are discussed immediately.  
Because food security and poverty are intimately related, the discussion of the AoA text 
considers both issues.  
 
Are the WTO categories adequate?  Some of the categories utilized by the WTO appear 
inadequate to capture food security concerns.  The most obvious case is the category of  
“developing countries”.  Concerns about the wide variety of countries that have self-
identified as developing countries, with special treatment, have existed for some time in 
GATT and now in the WTO.  Those concerns are borne out by the clustering analysis in 
the study by Diaz-Bonilla et al (2000), which classifies 165 countries into 12 clusters 
accoding to level of food security (Cluster one being the most food insecure while Cluster 
12 is the most food secure). Developing countries appear scattered across all levels of 
food (in) security, except in cluster 12, a  very high food secure group. 
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The category of NFIDCs, in turn, is split between food insecure and food neutral groups:  
eleven out of the 19 countries appear in clusters 1 to 4 (including Kenya which appears in 
cluster 1, the most food insecure, and Botswana, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, and Peru, in cluster 2).  The remaining eight countries are classified in clusters 
5 and 7, with intermediate levels of food security.
1   
 
Being a net food importer appears to be only a weak indicator of food vulnerability.  
Some countries may be net food exporters but still have a larger percentage of their total 
exports allocated to buy food, and vice-versa (for example Mali, is a net food exporter 
but its food bill is about 15 percent of total exports, while Venezuela, and NFIDC, spends 
about 5 percent of total exports on imported food).  Additionally, some countries may be 
net food importers just because of a dominant tourist industry (like Barbados, which also 
has the highest income per capita of the NFIDCs, about US$7,000).  Other NFIDCs have 
important levels of oil exports (such as the case of Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago) 
and therefore imports of food only reflect the comparative advantages of their production 
structure.  In any case, the seven NFIDCs considered here in the food neutral group 
(excluding Egypt), have food imports that represent about nine percent of total exports, 
higher than the developing countries’ average of six percent, but much lower than the 
food insecure NFIDCs’ (including Egypt) average of 16 percent.   
 
The category of LDCs, on the other hand, does correspond broadly to countries suffering 
from food insecurity, even though this issue was not explicit in their definition.  Only 
three (Cape Verde, Maldives, and Myanmar) of the 43 LDCs covered in this study are not 
among the vulnerable countries in clusters 1 to 4.  According to UNCTAD data, the first 
two have incomes per capita of US$990 and 1,255 (1997), respectively, which represents 
four to five times the LDCs’ average of US$235.  For Myanmar, UNCTAD reported an 
income per capita of US$3,657 (1997).    
 
If an expanded view of cluster 4 is taken, as suggested in footnote 1, then Cape Verde 
and Maldives, also fall in the food insecure category, leaving only Myanmar in the food 
neutral group.  Although 42 out of 43 LDCs considered in this study are food insecure 
according to the typology presented here, some countries that have a food security profile 
similar to the more vulnerable LDCs, are not included in this category, like Kenya.  Other 
countries with somewhat better profiles, but still in the food insecure categories, are 
neither LDCs nor NFIDCs, such as El Salvador, Georgia, Mongolia, and Nicaragua (all 
WTO members).     
 
In terms of the WTO negotiations, the analysis presented here suggests that to define 
specific rights and obligations in the WTO based on food security concerns using the 
category of LDCs appears an appropriate starting point, but may not be enough.  Some 
                                                 
1 If an expanded definition of Cluster 4 is taken to include very trade stressed countries, then Egypt is in the 
trade insecure category, mainly because of a very high food bill of almost 20 percent of total exports.  In 
that case, this analysis will classify as food insecure 12 out of 19 countries within the NFIDCs, or about 63 
percent of the cases, while more than one third of the NFIDCs will not be in the food insecure category (for 
more details see Diaz-Bonilla et al, 2000).   
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food insecure countries appear to be excluded because they have been defined neither as 
LDCs nor as NFIDCs.  
 
A possible approach would be to consider for special treatment under food security 
concerns both LDCs as defined by the United Nations plus all those countries classified 
as food insecure under some objective criteria (such as those utilized in the cluster 
analysis).  A simplified approach would be to combine an indicator of consumption 
vulnerability (an average of calories and proteins per capita), with an indicator of trade 
stress (the food import bill as percentage of all total exports) to identify countries that are 
food insecure.  Countries may move in and out of the food insecure category so defined, 
depending on their performance according to the combined consumption trade measure. 
 
Those food insecure countries would receive a treatment similar to LDCs for rights and 
obligations related to domestic support and their own market access.  Also, they will be 
considered for the food aid, financial support, and technical assistance envisaged in the 
Ministerial Decision on possible negative effects of the agricultural reform program on 
LDCs and NFIDCs.  The issue of special access to other countries’ markets for LDCs, 
and the additional benefits conferred upon LDCs because of reasons other than food 
security, would still be limited only to the countries specified by the United Nations.  The 
quantitative limits suggested would help differentiate developing countries that may need 
special treatment in terms of food security from those that do not.     
 
A special issue is the current definition and composition of the category of NFIDCs.  This 
classification, negotiated during the Uruguay Round, has implications as defined in the 
Ministerial Decision, and constitute an acquired right.  The implementation of that 
Decision, as discussed in the meetings of the Committee on Agriculture of the WTO, 
appears to have been limited mostly to exchanges of information among multilateral 
organizations and bilateral donors about programs already under execution.  In particular, 
there was no special action taken during the 1995-1996 increases in agricultural prices, 
because the agencies providing food aid (and financial and technical assistance) 
considered that the rise was not related to the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agricultural agreements.  For that reason, many LDCs and NFIDCs have been calling for 
objective criteria to “operationalize” the Ministerial Decision (UNCTAD, 2000).   
 
The use of cut off values for food insecure countries would help accomplish such 
operationalization, defining more precisely the group of countries that appear vulnerable 
to food security problems.  It can be argued that the perception that the category of 
NFIDCs is not adequate (because it leaves vulnerable countries out, while including 
countries that are relatively better off) may have contributed to the lack of 
implementation of the Decision.   
 
In any case, the current category of NFIDCs has been defined for reasons beyond food 
security.  Therefore this analysis does not suggest to have it changed because it is less 
useful in addressing food security issues, and the WTO members already included may 
remain in it.  But the operationalization of the Ministerial Decision using specific 
indicators, as indicated here, implies that the application of the Decision, in what is  
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related to food security concerns, will have effects only on part of the current members 
that fit the criteria, while it should also include other countries not currently considered 
within the NFIDCs.  
 
It is also relevant to ask about the food security situation of the developed countries.  
Several developed countries have advanced the notion of food security as part of the 
“multifunctionality” of agriculture, or, more generally, among non-trade concerns.  Our 
typology, however, shows that developed countries are unanimously concentrated in the 
food secure groups, according to the variables utilized here.  There appears to be a very 
different meaning of the term “food security” in developed and developing countries.  In 
terms of policy implications and the agricultural negotiations, maintaining the same label 
for two altogether different situations only obscures the issues being negotiated.  The 
discussion of food security should be limited to the vulnerability of developing countries, 
using a different terminology for developed countries.  
 
Are the AoA and other WTO legal texts adequate to address issues of food security and 
poverty?  The AoA includes different clauses that are directly or indirectly related to food 
security and poverty issues.  The following discussion focuses mostly on the legal 
aspects, without necessarily analyzing the economic advantages or disadvantages of the 
different clauses.   
 
(1) The most obvious instrument available in the AoA is the use of stocks for food 
security reasons.   
 
Annex 2 of the AoA presents the Green Box measures, which include “all support 
policies provided through a publicly-funded government program not involving transfers 
from consumers” and which do “not have the effect of providing price support to 
producers”.  They are exempted from reductions provided they comply with other 
specific criteria established in Annex 2, paragraph 1, of the AoA.  The list of those 
programs and the specific policy criteria and conditions, as detailed in Annex 2, include, 
among others:  Public stockholding for food security purposes.  The stocks must be an 
integral part of a food security program identified in national legislation.  It may include 
government aid to private storage of products as part of such a program.  They must 
correspond to predetermined targets related solely to food security, the process of stock 
accumulation and disposal must be financially transparent, and the products must be 
bought “at current market prices and sales from food security stocks shall be made at no 
less than the current domestic market price for the product and quality in question” 
(Annex 2, paragraph 3). 
 
A footnote in the Annex indicates that “governmental stockholding programs for food 
security purposes in developing countries whose operation is transparent and conducted 
in accordance with officially published objective criteria or guidelines shall be considered 
to be in conformity with the provisions of this paragraph, including programs under 
which stocks of foodstuffs for food security purposes are acquired and released at 
administered prices, provided that the difference between the acquisition price and the 
external reference price is accounted for in the AMS”  




Emergency food stocks may have an important role to play in food security 
arrangements.  Carrying stocks as an insurance mechanism is different from using stocks 
to stabilize domestic grain prices, which has proved expensive and relatively ineffective 
(Hazell, 1993; Knudsen and Nash, 1990).  The conditions established in the AoA are that 
those stocks must be built based on clearly defined targets, for instance as a percentage of 
total consumption.  Also, it would help to define a specific number of key food items (no 
more than three to five), for which stocks will be formed.  Several studies suggested that 
relatively small percentages of total consumption may suffice to act as an insurance 
mechanism (Hazell, 1993; this study refers to McIntire, 1981, which calculates that 
stocks of five percent of total consumption may be enough for SSA countries).  Also the 
AoA requires transparent financial arrangements, which is a sensible requirement to 
avoid waste and corruption.   
 
The key point, though, is that those stocks must be bought and sold at market prices.  The 
language is clear on sales from the stock: those prices are “current domestic market 
prices” (which includes whatever level of tariff protection the country may have).  But it 
can also be interpreted that it is the case when buying food products.  For poor countries 
it makes sense not to add to the costs of the food security program through the use of 
administered prices, which tend to generate losses buying high to support farmers and 
selling low to subsidize consumers.  If a government buys at harvest time 10 percent of 
the production of a specific crop, paying market prices, to achieve the stock to 
consumption ratio, it would give some price support with respect to the counter factual of 
no intervention (Islam and S. Thomas, 1996; p 58-61).  Since all the operations are 
conducted at market price, ideally using some sort of auction, the program would be part  
of the Green Box and would not be subject to any discipline under the AoA.   
 
In order to avoid any doubts about the applicability of this Green Box measure, some 
language can be added to indicate that LDCs and countries that are food insecure as 
defined by some objectives indicators (such as the combined consumption and trade 
measure suggested above) are presumed to be in compliance with the AoA (and also 
exempt from any remedy applied under Article 13; see below) when they build food 
security stocks for a small number of pre-specified products, and that do not exceed a 
limited percentage of domestic consumption (i.e. stocks for not more than 10 percent of 
domestic consumption for up to five products).  
 
If a developing country decides to use administered prices instead of the prices prevailing 
in the domestic market, then, according to the footnote, the difference with the external 
reference price (which is not the current world price, but the 1986-88 price established 
for the original calculations) must be counted as part of the AMS.  Yet, if the food 
security stock does not exceed, say, 10 percent of consumption, it would take a relatively 
large price subsidy (along with a large percentage of imports in domestic consumption), 
for a developing country to exceed the 10 percent de minimis exemption per product.  In 
those cases though, the program would have changed from food security to price support, 
and it would most likely suffer from financial problems and lack of sustainability, 
whatever its status may be under the AoA.    




(2)  A second instrument for food security, which is also part of Green Box measures in 
Annex 2, is domestic food aid.  According to Annex 2, paragraph 4, food aid has to be 
offered to population in need subject to clearly-defined criteria related to nutritional 
objectives; food purchases must be made at market prices; the financing and 
administration of the aid shall be transparent; and food aid can be in the form of direct 
provision of food or the provision of means to allow eligible recipients to buy food either 
at market or at subsidized prices.  In the case of developing countries, a footnote indicates 
that “for the purposes of paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Annex, the provision of foodstuffs at 
subsidized prices with the objective of meeting food requirements of urban and rural poor 
in developing countries on a regular basis at reasonable prices shall be considered to be in 
conformity with the provisions of this paragraph”.   
 
Again, the AoA allows food security interventions, but imposes some sensible 
requirements, such as to have a clear plan with well-defined nutritional criteria, focusing 
on “population in need”.  Moreover, in the case of developing countries, there may be 
subsidized interventions for urban and rural poor.  As in many instances, the issue is not 
legal restraints under the AoA, but rather how to design and finance adequate 
interventions (see Coady and Skoufias, 2001 for analysis of different interventions)  
 
Although the formation of stocks, as indicated, can also help producers if the buying is 
timed adequately (Islam and Thomas, 1996), the two measures discussed so far operate 
mostly from the consumption, or demand, side.  But developing countries usually 
emphasize the production side of food security.  Several of them have indicated their 
concern regarding agricultural and trade policies that may create problems for their large 
rural populations, where poverty is still concentrated and which are basically agricultural 
producers (WTO 2000a, and 2000b, WTO India).  These concerns are related to issues of 
domestic support (how to provide meaningful support to agricultural producers, specially 
small farmers), market access (particularly the impact of further liberalization and how to 
manage import surges), and export subsidies (that may displace local producers).  
 
Regarding domestic support, it has been already argued that for industrialized and 
developing countries, the Agreement on Agriculture allows a great latitude in domestic 
support policies: Green Box measures (Annex 2), Blue box (Article 6, paragraph 5), the 
de minimis exemptions (Article 6 paragraph 4 b), and the fact that the Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS) was changed from being product specific to an aggregate for 
all products (Article 6 paragraph 1).  Developing countries, in addition to a de minimis 
exemption of 10 percent (as already indicated), are allowed to reduce their levels of 
domestic support less than non-developing members of the WTO and to implement the 
commitments in a period of 10 years instead of 6 (article 15, paragraph 2).  Least 
Developed Countries, as defined by the United Nations, are completely exempt from any 
reduction in domestic support (Article 15 paragraph 2).  
 
Additionally, Article 6 paragraph 2 exempts developing countries from reduction 
commitments in yet other categories of domestic support.  They include “measures of 
assistance, whether direct or indirect, to encourage agricultural and rural development”  
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which “are an integral part of the development programs of developing countries”.  The 
article mentions investment subsidies generally available to agriculture; agricultural input 
subsidies to low-income or resource-poor producers; and support to eradicate illicit 
narcotic crops through diversification.  Article 6.2 concludes saying that “domestic 
support meeting the criteria of this paragraph shall not be required to be included in a 
Member’s calculation of its Current Total AMS”.     
 
Therefore a developing country is legally entitled under WTO to provide additional 
investment support to their agricultural producers provided that those countries show that 
the measures are “an integral part of development programs of developing countries”, or, 
in the case of input subsidies (from credit to fertilizers or water) if they are given to “low-
income or resource- poor producers”.  By extension of the criteria of the Green Box, it 
could be argued that these interventions would be more protected from challenges, if they 
were part of clearly defined and publicly-funded government program (Annex 2.1 and 
Annex 2.5).  Article 6, paragraph 2 has the advantage, from the point of view of equity, 
that it compels developing countries to design specific programs for rural development or 
alleviation of rural poverty, instead of resorting to general and non-transparent subsidy 
schemes that may benefit richer farmers or be wasted in corruption. 
  
Article 6.2 would, for example, allow the use of input subsidies to poor farmers to 
promote production of a staple crop as part of a rural development program for such 
producers, without having to count those expenditures under the AMS, and therefore, 
without having to reduce them within the WTO commitments.     
 
The only restriction is that those subsidies, may be actionable under Article 13 b), 
particularly if they exceed the budgetary limit of subsidies decided (not necessarily 
granted) in 1992 by product (13, b, ii and iii).  As an example, suppose that a low-income 
country decides to subsidize poor farmers for their use of fertilizers in a specific staple 
crop.  Suppose that the program is so highly successful that as a result of it poor farmers 
not only supply the additional domestic demand (beginning with their own requirements 
and including urban population) but also displace previous imports in that product.  
Suppose further that the expenditures of the program in that low-income country have 
exceeded those approved for that crop in 1992.  Then those countries that were suppliers 
of that market and that now may have been displaced, may claim “serious prejudice” (as 
in Article XVI, paragraph 1, of GATT 1994 or Articles 5 and 6 of the Subsidies 
Agreement), or “non-violation nullification” or “impairment of the benefits of tariff 
concessions” (as in Article XXIII paragraph 1(b) of GATT 1994).   
 
Some have interpreted Article 13 as prohibiting domestic subsidies in excess of 1992 
budgetary limits (Solagral, 1999).  In fact, those subsidies are not prohibited, but may be 
“actionable”, meaning that the complaining WTO member must support its claim proving 
either serious prejudice, on one hand, or nullification or impairment of benefits, on the 
other.   
 
The whole scenario for such complaints appears unlikely in the case of most if not all 
poor developing countries, because it must combine the case of a highly successful  
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program that displaces imports (when in fact most of the production of such a product 
would go to expanded domestic consumption) or reduces prices significantly in the 
domestic market, and the existence of a significant export market previous to the program 
(to make it commercially worthwhile to initiate a WTO complaint).  Also, there must be a 
WTO member (basically an industrialized country or a higher income developing 
country, considering the origin of most food exports), that is willing to incur in the public 
relations costs to sue a poor country on a program aimed at poor farmers for production 
of food.  Yet because the unlikely sometimes happen (particularly difficult to judge given 
the willingness of different governments in the WTO members to place human decency 
concerns above other considerations), the current agricultural negotiations may be well 
advised to clarify in greater detail the interface between the “de minimis” exemption, 
Article 6.2, and Article 13, particularly for poor countries with problems of food 
insecurity.   
 
•  One possibility is to follow the same approach as for food stocks and include 
language in the AoA specifying that LDCs and countries that are food insecure as 
defined by some objectives indicators, are exempted from the 1992 limits of Article 
13, not only in regard to Article 6.2, but also regarding the de minimis exemption.  
Another issue linked to Article 6.2 is the meaning of “low-income or resource poor 
producers”.  An alternative is to take the usual measure of 1 dollar a day, as the 
poverty line used for international comparisons, or a relative measure within the 
country (for instance, producers with less than 40 percent of national income per 
capita).  In general, if food insecure countries are defined according to objective 
criteria, some language can be included to the effect that they are presumed in 
compliance with the criteria of Article 6.2.  
 
•  An alternative is to create a special safeguard for food security reasons.  Some 
developing countries have requested the possibility of extending the utilization of the 
SSG also to them.  As mentioned before the SSG is available only to countries, 
mostly developed ones, which tariffied their border measures.  Other developing 
countries, however, want the SSG eliminated and a new special safeguard created for 
food security reasons.  Conceivably this can be done taking the common safeguard of 
Article XIX (Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products) of GATT 1994, 
and including some modifications such as (i) streamlined and faster procedures for a 
limited number of designated crops for food security reasons, and (ii) exemptions 
from the need to offer compensations, linked to the temporary use of the safeguard 
(see FAO, Sharma 2000)  
 
An additional issue, raised by several developing countries, is the possibility that 
expenditures aimed at reconstructing the agricultural sector after natural disasters or wars 
be completely exempted from disciplines.  
 
Finally, current negotiations should also consider carefully other issues of food 
availability and price volatility.  A general concern must be the provision of adequate 
levels of food aid, which has declined in recent years, and the avoidance of cycles that 
tend to reinforce, instead of counteract, situations of oversupply and shortages (i.e. the  
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fact that there is excess of food aid when world supplies are abundant and lack of it when 
supply conditions are tight).  Food aid should be made available in grant form, target 
poor countries and social groups, and be delivered in ways that do not displace domestic 
production in the receiving countries.  Badly managed food aid, or cheap food imports 
due to export subsidies, may just reinforce the bias of economic policies against the rural 
sector, with its negative impact on poor agricultural producers in developing countries.   
 
It is also necessary to provide technical assistance and financial support to develop 
agriculture in food insecure countries, and to maintain and expand financial facilities 
(both multilateral and bilateral) to help with short-term difficulties in financing food 
imports.  
 
A special aspect is to make sure that export controls and export bans on food items are 
tightly disciplined so as not to hamper access to food by importing countries.     
 
The issue of volatility in agricultural prices must also be monitored carefully: while 
expansion of world agricultural trade should help to spread supply or demand shocks 
over larger areas (thus limiting overall fluctuations), world public stocks have been 
declining as a percentage of consumption, which may increase the possibility of price 
volatility.  Improvements in early warning systems of food shortages, in weather forecast, 
and in transportation and storage, along with an adequate programming of food aid and 
financial facilities for emergencies, should help net food importers.   
 
3.5.Intellectual Property Rights, Technology, and Agriculture  
 
Of course, issues of intellectual property rights (IPR) are not part of the negotiations of 
the AoA, but of Trade Related Aspects of Intelletual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Yet they 
have implications for agriculture, poverty, and food security in developing countries.  
The link is mostly through technology.    
 
Technological change has been key to expanding world agricultural production during 
much of the twentieth century, especially so during the last few decades.  This contrasts 
with previous human experience when increases in the volume of food and fiber 
produced depended largely on bringing new lands under cultivation.  In turn, 
improvements in agricultural productivity were closely linked to investments in 
agricultural research and development (R&D), and to the policies affecting R&D 
decisions.  Typically the analysis of technology policies has focused on the amount and 
allocation of funds for that research, training scientists and their technical support staffs, 
and building or strengthening institutions for developing and disseminating technologies.  
In this regard, the main concerns over the past several decades have centered on the 
slowdown in growth of funding for agricultural R&D and the weakening of the 
institutions linked to the generation and transmission of technology, both in developed 
and developing countries.  Increases in private investments, and some (but by no means 
universal) recovery in public funding during the 1990s, do not seem to have changed the 
basic funding trends.   
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Meanwhile, a key technological development has been the emergence of biotechnology 
and genetically modified crops.  These products have led to a heated debate, related to 
their impact on future food production, and on poverty and hunger.  On the one hand, 
there are those who argue that GM products are not needed to feed the world in the 
future.  In this view, there is enough food in the world; food insecurity and hunger are 
income distribution and employment problems, not production problems; biotech 
products may pose health problems because of allergens and antibiotics; they may affect 
the environment and biodiversity; and, for the future, there may be other better, safer 
and/or cheaper technological alternatives.  Moreover, these technologies may increase the 
gap between rich and poor (be those countries, producers, consumers).  In this view, even 
if the technology per se had some potential to alleviate poverty, malnutrition, and hunger, 
biotech firms, which already have monopoly powers, and have been using indigenous 
genetic material from developing countries without compensation, do not have any 
incentive under the existing IPR framework to apply the technology to those ends. 
  
Those who advocate keeping the biotechnological alternative open point to the declining 
yields since the Green Revolution.  They argue that biotech can help to produce better 
food (including products with higher vitamin and mineral content, more and better 
proteins, reduced content of toxins, and removal of allergens).  Also it can help with 
better crops that alleviate land and water stress, and help the environment and 
biodiversity through reduced application of agrochemicals and less land use.  They 
consider that biotech can contribute to alleviate problems of poverty and malnutrition.  
Even if there is enough food at the world level, its global redistribution does not solve the 
local problem in the medium term.  What is needed is that production, employment, and 
incomes increase in poor countries and in poor rural regions.  And biotech is well 
positioned to do so.  First, it is scale neutral.  Second, and better than the Green 
Revolution, it has the possibility to address problems of marginal areas (such as droughts, 
low fertility, salt, and acidity), and specific pests and diseases that affect poor producers.  
The positive view recognizes that complementary policies, as well as adequate safeguards 
and regulatory frameworks, are needed.  Also, they argue that public-private 
collaboration is fundamental to develop applications addressing underdevelopment, 
poverty, malnutrition, and hunger.  The question is how to align research that is mostly 
private with the generation of the required public goods.   
 
Some have questioned the possibility of doing that, because, in parallel with the 
development of biotechnology, there has been a sea change in the treatment of IPR at the 
world level.  The protection of intellectual property rights, part of the TRIPS Agreement 
of WTO, could provide incentives for innovation, expanding the supply of available 
technologies, or it may simply reallocate market power and rents among suppliers and 
users of technology without discernible consequences for the generation and adoption of 
new technologies.   
 
In order to evaluate those claims, it is important to understand that there is no such thing 
as an “international intellectual property right”, at least in relation to patents and plant 
breeders’ (for other forms of IPR such as copyrights, international treaties provide a form 
of international protection).  A patent awarded in one country does not confer property  
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rights in the rest of the world.  Patents and other IP rights are awarded by national 
governments, and the protection conferred extends only as far as the geographic 
boundaries of the country in which the rights (which also may vary from country to 
country) are awarded.  Thus, to obtain protection in several countries, rights must be 
applied for and awarded in each. 
 
International treaties and organizations do, however, play an important role in IPR.  For 
agriculture, one of the most important ones is the International Convention for the 
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (known as the “UPOV Convention,” after a French 
acronym) of 1961 (revised in 1978 and 1991).  During  the Uruguay Round, the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights was approved 
(GATT, 1994: Annex 1C).  The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (whose aims 
are the conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components, and the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources), also contains some provisions on IP rights,  
 
Although aspects of IP protection may vary among countries, the TRIPs Agreement sets 
out minimum standards that each country belonging to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) must implement.  The point to be noticed, however, is that there is room for 
developing countries to tailor legislation to their own needs (Correa, 2000).  One of the 
most critical provisions, Article 27(1) of TRIPs, requires member states (about three-
quarters of the world’s countries) to allow patents for any inventions, “whether products 
or processes, in all fields of technology.”  This Article reduced the scope of long-standing 
conflicts over pharmaceutical product patents, but left the issue of protection for 
biological matter and agricultural biotechnology open, through the exceptions to 
patentability allowed under Articles 27(2) and (3).   
 
Because TRIPs does not define the term “invention,” countries can determine that 
biological matter, such as genes, are merely a “discovery” and not an invention, which 
then cannot be patented.  Some countries are implementing legislation along these lines.  
In addition, exceptions are allowed in order to protect order public; human, animal and 
plant life; and avoid serious harm to the environment.   
 
More importantly, Article 27(3)(b) allows members to exclude from patentability “plants 
and animals other than micro-organisms as well as essentially biological processes for 
their production”.  Although members are not required to allow plants to be patented, 
they must nevertheless provide protection of plant varieties, either by patents or by an 
“effective sui generis system” or by combination of both systems.  Plant protection 
systems are relatively well established in developed countries, but many developing 
countries are currently struggling to comply with the implementation of TRIPs.   
 
Developing countries are unlikely to implement patent protection for plants, and basically 
they have subscribed to a particular sui generis system, the International Convention for 
the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).  The rights accorded under UPOV 
extend not only to the plants but also to plant parts, harvested materials, and “essentially 
derived varieties.”  The 1978 UPOV version expressly established the “farmers’  
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exemption” that allows farmers to save seed for re-propagation.  The 1991 UPOV does 
not require that such exemption be implemented by member states, but it allows countries 
to do so, if they wish.  
 
It should be noticed that the combination of being able to exclude from patentability but 
the need of “sui generis” protection applies only to plants, and not to animals.  The latter 
can be simply excluded from patentability without having to offer any other protection 
instead.  
 
Thus, it appears that in the fields of agriculture and agricultural biotechnology the type 
and scope of protection will vary greatly from country to country, and especially from 
North to South.   
 
One issue is whether the international proliferation of intellectual property regimes and 
rights may impede agricultural research conducted in, or of consequence for, developing 
countries.  Binenbaum et al (2000) analyzed this question in detail and conclude that the 
current concerns about the freedom to operate (FTO) in agricultural research oriented 
towards food crops for the developing world are exaggerated.  Rights to intellectual 
property are confined to the jurisdictions where they are granted, and, presently, many of 
the intellectual property (IP) rights for biotechnologies potentially useful to developing-
country agricultural producers are valid only in developed countries.  In their opinion, for 
now at least, most researchers in developing countries have significant FTO with respect 
to food staples, and undue concern with that issue may be diverting attention from the 
lack of financial and technical support necessary for the effective generation, evaluation, 
adaptation, and regulation of newly available technologies by public and international 
nonprofit breeders in developing countries, given the continued inability of private-sector 
research to fill the gap. 
 
A second issue is the impact on farmers.  Again in this regard countries appear to have 
enough room under TRIPS to design its own domestic system according to their needs 
(Correa, 2000).  In particular, the right of farmers to save seeds can be protected, even 
under UPOV 1991.  This does not mean that developing countries do not have problems 
about TRIPS: as argued for the SPS agreement, the administrative costs of an IPR system 
may impose an undue burden to the economy of a poor country, when looking at the 
share of GDP involved.  Again, developing countries should not be forced to devote a 
comparatively larger percentage of resources to these regulatory aspects than what 
developed countries are spending.   
 
Whatever the implications of TRIPS for the process of generation and adoption of 
technology, it is not the only legal areas within the WTO that alone, or in their 
relationship with other international legal frameworks, could have significant 
implications for the technological evolution of developing countries.   
 
Currently, a main issue appears to be the possible impact of consumer and environmental 
concerns, particularly in developed countries, on the development of biotechnology.  In 
the case of consumers in high-income countries, benefits from biotechnology seem minor  
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in terms of price reductions, while the unknown dangers appear magnified by mistrust 
and lack of information (Per Pinstrup and Cohen, 2000).  
 
A ban of GM products in developed countries based on their own consumer and 
environmental concerns would not only have market access effects, but may also impede 
the materialization of financial support from industrialized countries to carry research and 
build human capital for biotechnology activities in developing countries.  Another 
possibility is that discussions in industrialized countries may spillover to developing 
countries where consumer and environmental concerns may block or slow down the 
development of biotechnology in those countries (Paarlberg, 2001).   
 
The WTO legal framework and environmental treaties are not the only, or even the most 
important components in those scenarios, mainly defined by consumers and 
environmentalists from developed countries.  The WTO legal texts related to consumer 
and environmental concerns include the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade of the WTO (TBT), and their interface with 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEA), particularly the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety (CPB) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.  The question here is what 
role these legal texts may play in leaving open, or closing, the technological opportunity 
offered by GM products.  One main issue is the role and extent of the precautionary 
approach or precautionary principle, i.e. the possibility of blocking the importation or 
domestic development of genetically modified crops or animals, in the absence of 
scientific evidence regarding their potential impact on health and the environment.   
 
The CPB has not been ratified yet.  Therefore the only operative legal frameworks are, 
for now, the SPS and TBT Agreements.  However, considerations of biosafety have 
slowed down the advance in biotechnology in several developing countries (Paarlberg, 
2001), and the WTO legal frameworks have not been invoked against those restrictions.  
The most basic issue is not legal though, but mostly political, emanating from the 
uncertainty of the consumers and the negative reactions of environmental Non 
Governmental Organizations (NGO) in developed countries.  
 
If those negative reactions persist over time, a question is how world markets would 
adjust to different scenarios of prohibition, segmentation, and differentiation.  Different 
simulations (Nielsen and Anderson, 1999; Nielsen and Robinson, 2000) show that 
segmentation in world markets is possible, with prices and quantities adjusting 
accordingly.  The main welfare effects happen to the countries not adopting 
biotechnology, which lose the productivity increases of the new varieties.   
 
Although markets may adjust to different alternatives, it is less likely, given a scenario of 
strong consumer preferences leading to prohibitions or strict segmentation, that public 
funds coming from industrialized countries to support biotechnology in developing 
countries may be forthcoming.  However the convergence between the European Union 
and the U.S. on the issue of biotechnology, with the recent report of the Joint 
Commission on Biotechnology, may point to a more permissive era.  The even more  
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recent definition of the approval process for GM products in Europe is an even stronger 
indicator in the same direction (Diaz-Bonilla and Pardey, 2001). 
 
 
4. Conclusions   
 
This paper aims at outlining the content of the policy debate and framework, but does not 
pretend to give specific answers.  Many of the issues raised require more research before 
drawing conclusions, and many of the hypotheses presented above must be viewed as 
tentative until more research is done.  
 
The first point to be stressed is the need to differentiate among situations, using objective 
indicators.  The categories of developed and developing countries mask a great 
heterogeneity.  Even the groups of LDCs and NFIDCs show internal variations, which in 
some cases appear important.  A central issue of the negotiations is food security.  This 
paper has suggested some specific criteria to distinguish among various situations of  
food (in) security, and that special and differential treatment be given to those groups 
clearly identified.  Most of the SDT changes discussed here, though, are clarifications or 
expansions of clauses already present in the AoA  (or other legal texts).   
 
The issue of quantification goes beyond groupings.  Some of the legal definitions may 
benefit from some hard numbers: for instance, the meaning of “low income” producers in 
Article 6.2.  More generally, some countries are asking that domestic support measures 
that are trade and production distorting be limited to a uniform percentage of the value of 
agricultural production (total or per product).  This seems a reasonable proposal to even 
out somewhat the currently very imbalanced playing field, where industrialized countries 
can spend large amounts of financial resources to support their producers.  In the same 
line, it has been suggested in this paper that the administrative and regulatory burden 
imposed by some of the WTO agreements (SPS and TRIPS, for instance) should not 
burden developing countries with costs that exceed, as a percentage of some metric, such 
as total GDP, or in relation to GDP per capita, to what is now the case in industrialized 
countries.  
 
Special and Differential Treatment should involve more than longer adjustment periods 
and partial exemptions.  Rather, it should involve a concern with ensuring that WTO 
obligations foster economic and social development in developing countries.    
 
As a background to that discussion, this paper analyzed different trends in the 
international trade of agricultural and food products from developing countries over the 
last decades.  A significant development has been the emergence of oilseeds and fruits 
and vegetables as the main exports from developing countries, replacing traditional 
exports such as sugar, coffee and cocoa.  Developing countries have surpassed industrial 
countries in the world market for oilseeds products, and have maintained their share in 
fruits and vegetables.  On the other hand, to their traditional dominance of international 
markets in cereals and dairy products, industrial countries have added increasing their  
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market share in meat, sugar, and processed cocoa.  In terms of regions, data also showed 
the collapse of African agro-industrial exports (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000). 
 
Obviously, some of the reasons explaining those trends are related to income and 
population growth, the natural resource base and climate in developing countries, and 
technological developments.  Cereals and dairy have lower yields in tropical zones where 
many developing countries are located, and the relationship between population and 
natural resources tends to be less favorable in those countries.  Over time, income growth 
and population pressures in developing countries tended to pull in imports and reoriented 
potential exports towards the domestic market, worsening the net trade position of those 
countries.  On the other hand, income growth and changes in consumption habits both in 
developing and industrialized countries offered new commercial opportunities in 
vegetable oils and fruits and vegetables.  Other reasons for the trends mentioned, 
however, center on economic policies in general, and trade policies in particular, both in 
developing and industrialized countries.  
 
It has been argued that trade and other economic policies appear to have been generally 
more supportive of agricultural production and exports in Asia, have had a more uneven 
record in LAC, and seem to have been just one component in a larger array of forces 
inhibiting economic development in Africa (Diaz-Bonilla and Reca, 2000).  The policy 
changes of the last years have improved the trade and macroeconomic framework in 
many developing countries (World Bank, 1999).   
 
Although further strengthening of those policies is still be needed in some of them, the 
performance of agricultural production and exports from developing countries appear 
now more dependent than ever from the completion of the needed process of policy 
reform in the agricultural and trade policies of the industrial countries.  Market access 
constraints, tariff escalation and product and export subsidies in rich countries have 
created significant limitations for the development of a thriving agricultural sector in 
developing countries.  The negotiations mandated in Article 20 of the Agreement on 
Agriculture should complete the process of policy reform initiated during the Uruguay 
Round, including increased market access, further disciplines in domestic support, and 
the elimination of export subsidies and other forms of unfair trade competition.  The 
agricultural sector in developing countries will not have a fair chance to contribute to the 
needed expansion of production and employment in those countries until the process of 
agricultural policy reform is completed also in the industrial world. 
 
Also food security concerns in developing countries may be linked to policy reform in 
industrialized countries.  For instance, to the extent that industrialized countries can 
utilize domestic subsidies to expand their production, and export subsidies to sell it in 
world markets, this may limit the possibility of food vulnerable countries to produce 
themselves a larger percentage of their food, and make them dependent on food aid or 
export subsidies.  Yet, food security in developing countries is basically a domestic issue, 
linked to food availability (which depends on domestic supply and trade), access (which 
requires broad-based development that reduces poverty), and utilization of (which 
depends on health and education investments, women empowerment, and better  
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governance) (see for instance Smith and Haddad, 2000).  For the agricultural sector, what 
is needed is investment in human capital, infrastructure, technology, land ownership by 
small producers and landless workers, community organization and participation, 
adequate functioning of product and factor markets, macroeconomic stability, and 
democratic participation.    
 
The AoA does not appear to constrain good policies that genuinely address poverty and 
food security issues (such as programs aimed at poor producers or consumers, stocks for 
food security and domestic food aid for populations in need).  Under the AoA, countries 
must make serious efforts to structure well-defined programs for poverty, food safety, 
and environmental protection.  Also poor producers can be helped by the disciplines on 
subsidized exports, leading to their elimination.  Yet, some clarifications in the language 
of the AoA during these negotiations (such as those discussed in this paper, or other 
similar) would certainly help to make sure that the legal texts do indeed address issue of 
development, poverty alleviation, and food security. 
 
Still poor countries face the issue of border protection to help agriculture.  The policy 
dilemma of high prices for poor producers or low prices for poor consumers cannot be 
wished away.  Whether development and poverty alleviation are helped by protection that 
operates as taxes on food, with the greater burden falling on poor consumers and the 
larger revenue accruing to large producers, is a question that must be faced.  Still 
developing countries need instruments to protect from import surges when they affect 
food security and large groups of poor producers.  Finally, developing countries, most of 
which have embarked in unilateral liberalization over the last decade, must, 
understandably, ask that the higher levels of protection in industrialized countries be 
reduced first.  
 
To conclude, the problems for developing countries are not legal constraints, but the lack 
of financial and human resources and institutional capabilities.  To link negotiations to 
development developing countries must consider the issue of funding for agricultural and 
rural development, food security and rural poverty alleviation.  One possibility is for 
country members (most of which are also WTO members) to ask that, as part of the 
negotiations, international organizations such as the World Bank, regional banks and the 
IMF, increase their funding and design or redesign some of their instruments to address 
agricultural and rural development, and food security issues (including volatility of 
government revenues and country exports) (see for instance Brookins, 2000).   
 
Attention must also be given to the continuation and enhancement of the reduction or 
cancellation of the external debt of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (the HIPC 
initiative), further liberalizing trade in textiles, and adequately managing capital flows. 
 
At the same time, improved international conditions should go hand in hand with a better 
domestic framework in developing countries.  This includes stable macroeconomic 
policies, open and effective markets, good governance and the rule of law, a vibrant civil 
society, and programs and investments that expand opportunities for all, with special 
consideration for disadvantaged groups and especially poor women.  Additional  
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investments and policy reform efforts will be required to improve infrastructure, 
strengthen internal financial markets, develop institutions to manage risks and reduce 
transaction costs, and expand entrepreneurial and labor skills. 
 
However, in countries affected by violence and war, and their neighbors suffering from 
the spillover of conflicts, a more supportive international environment and better 
macroeconomic, trade and investment policies will not help ensure agricultural and rural 
development, substantial reductions in poverty and enhanced food security, until military 
confrontations stop. 
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